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1DEFINITION	OF	KEY	TERMS		
Abnormal return: The return earned by a security or a portfolio of securities that is unexplained
by the risk loadings of a particular risk model (McClelland, 2014).
Agency costs:  The loss of shareholder value resulting from the conflict  of interests between
managers and shareholders that arises when the control and ownership of a firm are separated
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
Behavioural models: Financial models that investigate the psychological and sociological
characteristics that influence the decision-making process of market participants, which in turn
influences the stock market (Ricciardi & Simon, 2000).
Beta: A measure of a share’s price sensitivity to changes in the market portfolio (McClelland,
2014). The market portfolio is proxied by the JSE All Share Total Returns index.
Equally-weighted approach: A method of measuring the performance (or return) of a portfolio,
where the return on every security in the portfolio is given the same weighting.
Issuing firms: Firms that conduct seasoned equity offerings, also referred to as SEO firms in
the context of this study.
JSE: The Johannesburg Stock Exchange.
Market capitalisation (size): A firm’s market price per share multiplied by the number of
shares outstanding.
Market efficiency: The extent to which share prices reflect all available information (Fama,
1970).
Market-to-book ratio (M/B): The market capitalisation of a firm divided by the firm’s book
value of equity.
Mixed security offering: The simultaneous issuing of two or more types of securities.
Rational models: Financial models that centre on the idea that market participants behave
rationally and that investor behaviour is explained by a risk-return framework (Ricciardi &
Simon, 2000).
2Rights offers: The offering of new shares to existing shareholders, usually at a discounted
price.
Secondary equity offering (SEO): The issue of new shares by a listed firm.
SEO Firms: Firms that conduct SEOs, also referred to as issuing firms in the context of this
study.
Size-matching procedure: The method of matching an issuing firm to a non-issuing firm that
is closest in size.
Style-matching procedure: The method of matching an issuing firm to a non-issuing firm that
is in the same size decile and that has the closest market-to-book ratio.
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM): A model used in the pricing of risky securities that
describes the relationship between risk and return (Sharpe, 1964).
The capital structure decision: The choice faced by managers in deciding on whether to
finance their firm’s operations with either debt or equity (Myers, 1984).
The new issues puzzle: A well-documented phenomenon describing the long-run
underperformance of SEO firms in comparison to similar, non-issuing firms.
The market timing theory: A theory that describes the incentives for managers to attempt to
time the market by issuing debt or equity when it is overvalued (Baker & Wurgler, 2002).
The risk-return framework: A rational explanation, that stems from modern portfolio theory,
for describing the returns of a security as a function of its risk. Ceteris paribus, a security that
has a higher risk should earn a higher return (Sharpe, 1964).
Tobin’s Q-ratio: The market value of a firm divided by its replacement costs, commonly used
in literature as a proxy indicating the quality of the firm’s investment opportunities (Kim &
Weisbach, 2008).
Value-weighted approach: A method of measuring the performance (or return) of a portfolio,
where the return on every security in the portfolio is weighted according to that security’s
relative market capitalisation.
3ABSTRACT	
International studies have widely documented the long-run underperformance of firms
conducting secondary equity offerings (SEOs), a phenomenon commonly referred to as the
‘new issues puzzle’. Understanding the market’s reaction to SEOs is vital for managers who
are  commonly  tasked  with  deciding  on  how  to  finance  their  firm’s  operations.  This  study
investigates the short-run and long-run performance of firms conducting SEOs on the
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) over the period of 1998 to 2015, by exploring both
rational and behavioural models in predicting SEO behaviour. Event-study analysis reveals that
the market generally reacts negatively to the announcement of SEOs with a statistically
significant average two-day cumulative abnormal return of -2.6%. Using a buy-and-hold
abnormal return approach, as well as factor regression analysis to study the long-run share
performance of issuing firms, there is no evidence that issuing firms significantly underperform
relative to non-issuing firms over a five-year period when testing for abnormal share return
performance with the Capital Asset Pricing Model. Furthermore, issuing firms exhibit no
consistent signs of operating underperformance in comparison to non-issuing firms over a five-
year period. Finally, in evidence contradicting the market timing theory, investor sentiment
appears to bear no consistently significant influence on either a firm’s decision to issue equity,
or on the short-run and long-run performance of SEOs. Overall, the results imply that the long-
run performance of SEOs conducted in South Africa is best described by rational explanations
centred on the risk-return framework. There is no consistent evidence of any ‘new issues
puzzle’ on the JSE.
	
41 Introduction		
The managers of firms are commonly faced with the imperative decision on which route to
navigate in raising finance for their firms. When internal funding is no longer an option,
managers are forced to look externally, with the choice between debt and equity weighing
heavily on their minds. The choice between debt and equity (henceforth, referred to as the
capital structure decision) can best be made when the consequences of selecting either path are
fully understood. Over the past decade, much academic attention has been dedicated to studies
attempting to elucidate the capital structure decisions that firms undertake.
The popularity of this topic has given rise to other avenues of research inspired by the capital
structure literature. In particular, fascinating patterns have emerged from studies focusing
specifically on the issuance of equity to the public by already listed firms, commonly referred
to as secondary equity offerings (SEOs).
Issuing new shares, despite its commonality and enormous importance, has presented a
challenge to the academic institution. In spite of all the existing literature delving into the
nuances of the equity issuing process, there remains an air of uncertainty and inconsistency
regarding the consequences of issuing new shares. Although clear patterns have emerged to
help forge a better understanding of the performance of firms surrounding SEOs, explaining
these patterns has been a source of great debate.
A  large  body  of  literature  has  documented  that  the  stock  market’s  reaction  to  a  firm’s
announcement of a secondary equity offering (SEO) is generally negative (Smith, 1986; Ritter,
2003)1. These findings are consistent with the adverse selection model proposed by Myers and
Majluf (1984).  The adverse selection model,  which is  widely regarded amongst the existing
literature as the conventional explanation for these negative announcement effects, proposes
that investors view the decision of a firm to issue shares as ‘bad news’ about the true value of
1 Both summarizing a large amount of existing literature, Smith (1986) reports an average two-day abnormal share
return of -3.14% for industrial firms following public equity announcements, whilst Ritter (2003) reports an
average two-day cumulative return of -2% around the announcement date.
5that firm. This is due to the incentives that managers have to issue shares when they are
overvalued in order to benefit existing shareholders, at the expense of new shareholders.
Extensive literature has also documented the long-run share underperformance of issuing firms
(SEO firms2) relative to similar non-issuing firms, igniting widespread debate. For instance,
Ritter (2003) reports an average underperformance of issuing firms of approximately 5% per
year over the five years following the issuance3. These findings are not unique to the United
States  of  America  (henceforth  US).  Levis  (1993)  and  Kang,  Kim  and  Stulz  (1999),  have
documented similar patterns in the investment performance of SEOs in the United Kingdom
(henceforth UK) and Japan, respectively.
In addition, literature has documented the long-run operating underperformance of issuing
firms. Loughran and Ritter (1997) find that issuing firms demonstrate significant improvement
in operating performance prior to issuing SEOs, which is then followed by a substantial post-
issue deterioration. McLaughlin, Safieddine and Vasudevan (1996) demonstrate the significant
decline in the profitability of issuing firms subsequent to conducting SEOs.
Subsequently, theories have been proposed over the years to try and explain this phenomenon
of long-run SEO underperformance that has commonly been referred to as ‘the new issues
puzzle’4. The various explanations for the long-run underperformance of issuing firms can be
divided into two broad categories: (1) theories based on rational explanations; and (2) theories
based on behavioural explanations.
The most prominent explanation for SEO underperformance, which emerges from behavioural
finance, is the market timing theory. In brief and in the relevant context, this theory assumes
that managers attempt to time the market by issuing shares when they are overvalued (Baker
2 Throughout this study the use of the terms ‘SEO firms’ and ‘issuing firms’ are interchangeable.
3 More evidence on long-run underperformance is provided by Loughran and Ritter (1995), Clarke, Dunbar and
Kahle (2001), and Lyandres, Sun and Zhang (2005).
4 A term coined by Loughran and Ritter (1995).
6& Wurgler, 2002). Investors are over-optimistic with respect to the firms issuing equity and
underreact to the SEO announcement whilst maintaining their biased, over-optimistic beliefs
about these issuing firms, which could arguably explain the long-run underperformance of SEO
firms (Loughran & Ritter, 1995). This reasoning has a huge implication that investors are
sluggish in adjusting their beliefs in reaction to new information, casting doubt on the
efficiency of the market if  indeed SEO firms underperform for periods extending up to five
years following the SEO as a result of investor over-optimism.
On the other hand, rational explanations for SEO underperformance centre on the concept of
the mispricing of risk. Put simply, these hypotheses attempt to explain the underperformance
of SEOs as a failure of the model specification in capturing risk, hence the failure of said model
in explaining returns.  The argument here is that the lower returns earned by SEO firms are in
response  to  the  lower  risk  faced  by  holding  the  shares  of  these  firms.  The  difficulty  in  this
argument is that it avoids the burden of proof. Claiming that a model is misspecified or ignoring
a  relevant  risk  factor  bears  more  weight  when  the  risk  can  be  identified  rather  than  simply
hypothesising the existence of an unknown. However, this burden of proof has not always been
ignored.
Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2000) claim that issuing firm underperformance is merely a
reflection of lower levels of systematic risk which is attributed to the lower leverage and
increased share liquidity of SEO firms after issuance. Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino (2006)
find that issuing firm underperformance disappears when measuring share performance using
a dynamic beta approach, where in every month following the issuance the realised beta for
that month is used to control for risk.
Despite the importance of understanding the market’s reaction to a critical component of a
firm’s financing activity, the empirical research surrounding the long-run performance of firms
conducting SEOs has largely been overlooked in the South African context, with the existing
South African literature focusing purely on capital structure decisions or initial public offerings
(IPOs).
7This study comprehensively tests the short-run and long-run effects of SEOs in the context of
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) by focusing on the relevant behavioural and rational
explanatory models proposed in previous literature. Although these results make a valuable
contribution to understanding the capital structure decisions faced by firms, it is important to
note that the purpose of this study is not to examine the capital structure decision itself. Instead,
the focus is solely on the impact and reasoning behind the decision to issue equity.
Firstly, using regression analysis, this study investigates the decision that a firm faces on
whether or not to conduct a SEO. A critical component of these regression models, and this
study in general, is the measurement of investor sentiment which is used to test the behavioural
theories, specifically in relation to examining any evidence of market-timing inferences. This
is accomplished with the use of the investor sentiment index developed by Baker and Wurgler
(2006), with adjustments made in adapting the index to the South African context in light of
the recent findings of Dalika and Seetharam (2015). Ceteris paribus, shares are more likely to
experience deviations from fundamentals during periods of high-investor sentiment (Chou &
Lin, 2015). Therefore, if managers are attempting to time the market in order to issue
overvalued shares, investor sentiment should play a significant role in a firm’s decision to issue
equity.
The results reveal that investor sentiment plays no significant role in a firm’s decision to
conduct a SEO. In addition, a firm’s prior abnormal share price performance and market-to-
book ratio5,  which  are  two  other  popular  measures  used  to  gauge  the  over-evaluation  of  a
share’s worth, also bear no significant influence on a firm’s decision to issue equity. Thus,
there is no concrete evidence of managers attempting to time the market when conducting
SEOs.
5 Some studies also refer to the ‘book-to-market ratio’, which is simply the inverse of the market-to-book ratio.
For consistency, the market-to-book ratio is used throughout this study.
8Secondly, an event-study is undertaken to study the short-run share performance of firms
around the SEO announcement date. In line with the international evidence, a significant
negative market reaction is found, with SEO firms experiencing an average two-day cumulative
abnormal return of -2.6% in response to the SEO announcement. Further analysis reveals that
the market’s reaction to the SEO announcement is in no way significantly influenced by
investor sentiment, again casting doubt on the predictions implied by the behavioural models
put forth in the literature. Moreover, neither the issuing firm’s size, market-to-book ratio,
Tobin’s Q-ratio6, nor the size of the equity issue relative to the issuing firm’s size, significantly
influence the market’s reaction to the SEO announcement.
Finally, the study investigates the comparative long-run share performance and operating
performance of SEO firms vis-à-vis their non-issuing counterparts. In order to test the rational
explanatory models of SEOs, three measures are used to test the comparative market
performance: (1) simple buy-and-hold returns; (2) buy-and-hold abnormal market returns7; and
(3) buy-and-hold abnormal realised returns as defined by use of the Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM)8. Operating performance is measured across three accounting ratios: (1) the
earnings per share ratio (EPS);  (2) the return on asset  ratio (ROA); and the return on equity
ratio (ROE)9.
The analysis reveals fascinating results. Although issuing firms typically underperform when
using the first two measures of market performance10, the use of the buy-and-hold abnormal
realised returns approach reveals no significant differences between the market performance
of issuing and non-issuing firms. This result implies that the variation in returns between issuers
and non-issuers is adequately explained by the CAPM.
6 A firm’s Tobin’s Q-ratio, the market value of the firm divided by its replacement costs, is commonly used in
literature as a proxy for the quality of the firm’s investment opportunities (Kim & Weisbach, 2008).
7 A share’s abnormal market return is defined as the difference between the share’s actual return and the market’s
return, where the market’s return is proxied by the JSE All Share Total Returns index.
8 A shares abnormal realised return is defined as the difference between the share’s actual return and its expected
return, where the expected returns are calculated using the CAPM. For robustness, factor regression models are
also used to measure abnormal performance based on the CAPM.
9 These accounting ratios are discussed in further detail in Sections 3.5.2 and 4.2.3.3.
10 Henceforth, share price performance and market performance are used as interchangeable terms.
9There is also no consistent evidence of any significant differences in the operating performance
patterns of issuing firms relative to non-issuing firms. Furthermore, in an overall poor showing
for the predictions set forth by the market timing theory, the results fail to provide any
consistent evidence that investor sentiment bears any significant influence on either the long-
run market performance, or the long-run operating performance of issuing firms.
Overall, there does not appear to be a ‘new issues puzzle’ in the South African context with the
evidence suggesting that the rational, risk-return framework best describes the long-run
performance of SEOs. Although the typically negative market reaction to SEO announcements
in the short-run seems to be explained by the adverse selection model proposed by Myers and
Maljuf (1984), there is no consistent evidence of issuing firm underperformance in the long-
run. Therefore, these findings fail to find any substantial support for the predictions set forth
by the market timing theory in explaining the long-run performance of SEOs.
1.1 Research	Objectives	and	Rationale	
1.1.1 The	Research	Problem	
International literature has widely documented the performance of SEOs in an attempt to better
understand the consequences faced by countless firms who decide to finance their firms by
issuing new shares.  Despite the importance of understanding both the market’s reaction to the
equity issuance,  as well  as its  effect  on the subsequent performance of the issuing firm, this
topic of study has widely been ignored in the South African context. This gap in the existing
South African research presents an opportunity for this study to make a new contribution to the
existing body of knowledge, by comprehensively studying the performance of SEOs conducted
on the JSE.
1.1.2 Objectives	
The main objective of this study is to examine the short-run and long-run effects of SEOs on
the JSE. This study explores the market’s initial reaction to the SEO announcement, as well as
the long-run financial and operating performance of issuing firms following the announcement.
10
This study also explores two sub-objectives, ranked by importance:
1. To test both the rational and behavioural models of explaining SEO performance.
Specifically, this study tests the rational explanation models by seeing whether long-run
performance is sensitive to the various model specifications, and tests the market timing
theory explanations (behavioural models) by examining the impact of investor sentiment
on the performance of SEOs.
2. To examine the impact of the issuing firm’s characteristics, and the details of the SEO
announcement, on the market’s initial reaction to the SEO announcement.
1.1.3 Rationale	
Managers are tasked with making imperative decisions with respect to raising external
financing. In order to make these decisions, managers need to be aware of both the direct and
the indirect costs of financing, as well as the information conveyed to the market.
Understanding the market’s reaction to SEOs will aid managers in making their decisions by
shedding more light on the indirect costs of issuing new shares (in particular the costs
associated with adverse selection and information asymmetries). The interaction between
financing and investing decisions make these concepts vital for managers to understand.
As aforementioned, the lack of research conducted in South Africa with regards to SEOs serves
as added motivation and further highlights the importance of this study. Additionally, the
inclusion of a robust measurement of investment sentiment in this study raises the prospect of
interesting and unique observations with regards to the field of behavioural finance and its
ability to explain SEO performance.
Finally,  on  a  broader  scale,  the  results  of  this  study  has  implications  on  the  level  of  market
efficiency in South Africa. The ability of managers to time the market would provide evidence
against strong-form market efficiency11 and the persistence of long-term irrational trends would
11 Strong-form market efficiency implies that all information, both private and public, is already reflected in
current share prices (Fama, 1970). Thus, the ability of managers to successfully time the market would contradict
strong-form market efficiency as it implies that managers have superior material information regarding the firm,
which is not reflected in the share price.
11
raise further doubt about the market’s efficiency. Hence, the findings of this study, which fails
to find support for the market timing theory, also fails to provide any evidence against the
strong-form efficiency of the JSE. There is no evidence of managers attempting to time the
market when conducting SEOs on the JSE, nor is there any evidence of SEO underperformance
in the long-run that would suggest any irrational long-term investor behaviour.
	
1.2 Hypotheses	
1.2.1 Primary	Hypotheses		
The main aim of this study is to test the short-run and long-run performance of issuing firms
following the announcement of the SEO.
 The first part of this study tests the announcement effects associated with SEOs:
· H1, 0: There are no significant two-day average abnormal share returns following SEO
announcements.
· H1, A: There are significant negative two-day average abnormal share returns following
SEO announcements12.
Secondly, by using different measures of testing for share price and operating performance, the
following hypothesis is tested:
· H2, 0: Issuing firms do not significantly underperform (or outperform) in comparison to
their non-issuing matching firms over a five-year period13.
· H2,  A: Issuing firms do significantly underperform in comparison to their non-issuing
matching firms over a five-year period.
1.2.2 Secondary	Hypotheses		
The  secondary  focus  of  this  study  is  to  analyse  the  influence  of  investor  sentiment  on  the
decision to conduct SEOs, the market’s reaction to the SEO announcement, and the long-run
12 All the alternative hypotheses (HA) represent the hypothesised relationships that are consistent with the SEO
literature as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.
13 Henceforth, comparative performance is also tested over 1-year and 3-year periods.
12
performance  of  SEO firms.  These  hypotheses  refer  to  the  behavioural  explanations  of  SEO
performance with a particular focus on the market timing theory:
· H3,  0: The probability of a firm conducting a SEO is not significantly influenced by
investor sentiment.
· H3,  A: Firms are significantly more likely to conduct SEOs during periods of high-
investor sentiment.
· H4, 0: Investor sentiment does not significantly influence the market’s reaction to SEO
announcements.
· H4, A: Firms that conduct SEOs during periods of high-investor sentiment, experience
significantly less negative abnormal returns following the announcement.
· H5, 0: Investor sentiment does not significantly influence post-issue underperformance
over a five-year period.
· H5, A: Firms that conduct SEOs during periods of high-investor sentiment, experience
significantly worse post-issue underperformance over a five-year period.
1.2.3 Tertiary	Hypotheses		
Finally,  this  study  aims  to  investigate  the  influence  of  the  explanatory  variables  that  could
potentially impact the market’s initial reaction to SEO announcements, by testing the following
hypotheses:
· H6,  0: The quality of a firm’s investment opportunities does not significantly influence
the market’s reaction to SEO announcements.
· H6, A: Firms with a higher quality of investment opportunities experience a significantly
less negative market response to SEO announcements.
· H7, 0: The size of the share issue (relative to the size of the firm issuing shares) has no
significant influence on the market’s reaction to SEO announcements.
· H7,  A: Larger share issues (relative to the size of the firm issuing the shares) will
experience a more significantly negative market response to SEO announcements.
13
· H8, 0: The characteristics of the issuing firm (namely size and age) have no significant
influence on the market’s reaction to SEO announcements.
· H8, A: Younger, smaller firms will have a more significantly negative market response
to their SEO announcements14.
The remainder of the study proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 discusses the relevant literature
surrounding SEOs; Chapter 3 extends the literature discussion to motivate the empirical
framework undertaken in this study; Chapter 4 sets out the methodology employed, with the
results discussed in Chapter 5; and Chapter 6 concludes the study.
	
14 Similar to the work of Chou and Lin (2015), the age of a firm is be proxied by the number of years that the firm
has been listed on the JSE.
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2 A	Review	of	the	Literature		
The literature review is divided into four main sections. The first section briefly describes the
capital structure theories, a widely-documented avenue of research that has since gone on to
inspire the development of the SEO literature. The second section describes the literature
documenting the market’s short-run response to the announcement of SEOs, commonly
referred to as ‘announcement effects’. The third section focuses on the long-run financial and
operating performance of SEO firms post-issue, with the relevant literature further divided into
rational and behavioural explanations for SEO long-run performance. The fourth section,
briefly touches on the relevant South African literature, bearing in mind the virtual absence of
research in South Africa that focuses specifically on SEOs.
2.1 Capital	Structure	Theories	
This section briefly discusses the capital structure literature with the aim of providing the full
background of the academic environment which has inspired the avenue of research focusing
solely on SEOs. After all,  it  is  the capital  structure literature that  has gone on to inspire the
SEO literature. The foundation was set by the seminal contribution of Modigliani and Miller
(1958) who famously claimed that in perfect capital markets, a firm’s total value is completely
independent of its capital structure. Therefore, any attempt to benefit from switching between
debt and equity or vice versa, is in vain. According to their findings, the choice between debt
and equity is irrelevant as it does not impact a firm’s value.
However, in reality capital markets are not perfectly efficient and two major theories have since
emerged in order to describe the crucial capital structure decisions that firms must make: the
trade-off theory; and the pecking-order theory. The trade-off theory argues that a firm’s optimal
capital structure is decided by balancing the benefits derived from the use of debt, such as its
tax advantages, with the disadvantages associated with firms being highly levered, such as the
risk and costs associated with financial distress.
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The pecking order theory argues that there is a hierarchy associated with the choice of
financing, based on the cheapest source of available financing. In consideration of the
information  costs,  firms  should  prefer  internal  funds  to  the  use  of  external  funds  and  in  the
event  that  external  funds  are  required,  firms  should  prefer  debt  to  equity  financing  (Myers,
1984).
Unfortunately, the evidence surrounding these two theories is not promising, as both these
theories are plagued by inconsistencies across the existent empirical literature15. Despite the
various other capital structure theories that have been developed over the years, a
comprehensive theory explaining capital structure decisions is yet to be discovered as this
‘puzzle’ remains unsolved (Barclay & Smith, 1999).
2.2 Announcement	Effects	(The	Short-run	Effects	of	SEOs)	
Faced with the puzzle that is the capital structure decision, authors began to pay more attention
to studying the market’s reaction to SEOs in more detail. The literature has since revealed some
fascinating patterns. Smith (1986), using the data from several previous studies, examined the
market’s reaction to the announcement of SEOs and found an average two-day abnormal share
return of -3.14% for industrials, and -0.75% for utilities. Ritter (2003), also making using of
several prior studies, found an average two-day cumulative return of approximately -2% around
the announcement date.
The adverse selection model developed by Myers and Majluf (1984), appears to be the most
commonly cited explanation by academics in explaining these negative announcement effects
(Ritter, 2003). Their model, which focuses on information asymmetries between managers and
investors, argues that managers are better informed than investors with respect to the true value
of the firm’s assets and its growth opportunities. Therefore, in the interest of existing
shareholders, managers will only issue equity when they believe that their equity is overvalued.
15 Barclay and Smith (1999) document the empirical inconsistencies of both the trade-off theory and the pecking-
order theory.
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Rational  investors  are  aware  of  the  manager’s  incentives  and  therefore  interpret  the
announcement of share issues as ‘bad news’ about the firm’s intrinsic value (Pilotte, 1992).
This  explanation  does  raise  a  serious  challenge  to  strong-form market  efficiency  as  there  is
overwhelming evidence that managers do indeed attempt to time the market, with the incentive
to issue equity when it  is  overvalued. Baker and Wurgler (2002) report  that  a firm’s capital
structure is significantly related to previous market valuations, which implies that a firm’s
capital structure is a result of its cumulative past attempts to time the market.
In a survey conducted by Graham and Harvey (2001), approximately two-thirds of chief
financial officers (CFOs) admitted that the relative over- or under-valuation of a share is a vital
consideration in their decision to issue equity. There is also evidence of managers attempting
to time volatility in an attempt to issue shares during periods of low market volatility (Carlson,
Fisher & Giammarino, 2006).
These findings are in line with the extensive body of research documenting the increase in
share issuance activity during periods of high market valuations (Jung, Kim & Stulz, 1996). It
would make logical sense that the preferred environment to issue shares is during robust market
conditions. DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2010) find a significant relationship between the
probability of conducting a SEO and common measures of mispricing such as pre-issue
abnormal returns, market-to-book ratios, and the age of a firm. However, measuring the correct
fundamental value of a share is subjective and another catalyst for wide-spread debate. Hence,
measures of investor sentiment are fast becoming the popular choice for gauging market
conditions.
Chou and Lin (2015) find that the probability of a firm conducting a SEO is positively related
to investor sentiment, as measured using the investor sentiment index developed by Baker and
Wurgler (2006). Not only are firms more likely to issue shares during periods of high-investor
sentiment, but they also experience less negative announcement effects when announcing the
SEO during periods of high-investor sentiment. It is argued that investors become overly
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optimistic during these periods of hyped sentiment, bidding share prices upwards and causing
deviations from fundamental values which creates incentives for managers to issue equity in
an attempt to time the market. This investor over-optimism also explains why investors are
reacting less negatively to SEO announcements during periods of high-investor sentiment. This
weakened negative response during high-investor sentiment periods might even create
additional incentives for manager to issue shares during these periods, in addition to the
incentive already created by the potential overvaluation of their firm’s equity.
Not all  announcements of equity offerings are interpreted as ‘bad news’ by the market.  The
interaction between financing and investing decisions is also a vital consideration, as the
announcement of an equity issue can convey multiple facets of information. Not only does it
convey information about the possible intrinsic value of the firm, but it also implies that the
firm will make use of the funds in its operations (Ritter, 2003). Bridging the ‘information gap’
between investors and managers should influence the market’s reaction to SEO
announcements.
If investors believe that the cash raised from the equity issue will lead to the firm investing in
a project that will add value to the firm, then the announcement effect could be positive or by
extension, less negative. Empirical evidence does suggest that there is a less negative reaction
to an equity issuance when firms can convince investors that there is a good reason for issuing
the equity (Ritter, 2003). Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996) provide evidence that firms with a high
Tobin’s Q-ratio have announcement effects that do not significantly differ from zero. In
contrast, Barclay and Litzenberger (1988) fail to establish any significant relationship between
announcement effects and either the Tobin’s Q-ratio or the intended used of funds.
Korajcyzk, Lucas and McDonald (1992), find evidence that the announcement effects
associated with equity issues are less negative when the announcement is made shortly after an
earnings report is issued, arguing that during this time period, there is less information
asymmetry. Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993) find that negative announcements effects are
diminished when the economy is in an expansionary phase, which is arguably when there may
be reduced adverse selection risk.
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Additionally, studies show that private equity issue announcements have a positive
announcement effect, with share prices increasing in response to said announcements (Wruck,
1989; Kato & Schallheim, 1993). This result is again consistent with information asymmetry
as it can also be argued that private equity issues are less susceptible to information
asymmetries.
In a similar manner, investors might fear that the cash raised from the equity issue might be
misused by the firm’s managers in value-destroying behaviour resulting from ‘empire
building16’ or ‘managerial hubris17’. Thus, agency problems18 could potentially compound the
negative  announcement  effect.  Jung,  Kim  and  Stulz  (1996),  find  evidence  that  firms  with
inferior managerial ownership, who are arguably more susceptible to the agency problems
described above, have more negative price reactions to announcing the issue of new shares.
Although the implications of the market timing theory in conjunction with the adverse selection
model are well-suited in explaining the negative announcement effects of SEOs, this does not
necessarily mean that timing the market is the most dominant motive for issuing equity. All
else equal, firms should predominantly issue equity out of the necessity to raise funds.  There
is also the school of thought that the expansion of a firm naturally leads to the point where the
firm needs to issue more shares, which is simply a by-product of the firm’s lifecycle stage.
Kim and Weisbach (2008) who studied SEOs across 38 non-African countries, found that the
primary reason for firms issuing new shares was to raise funds to appease the near-term
necessity  for  cash.  They  found  that  both  the  market  timing  theory  and  the  stage  of  a  firm’s
lifecycle, only play a role as secondary considerations. These results are echoed by the findings
16 A term used to explain the actions of managers who attempt to aggressively grow their firm beyond the optimal
size or increase their influence in the firm (Jensen, 1986).
17 The  over-optimistic  belief  held  by  the  managers  of  bidding  firms  with  respect  to  the  value  that  they  can
potentially add to their firm by acquiring another firm. These beliefs may cause managers to over-estimate the
value that the acquisition will bring (Roll, 1986).
18 Agency problems, also known as agency costs, refers to the value lost by shareholders as a result of the conflicts
of interests that exist between shareholders and managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). These conflicts of interest
arise due to the separation of ownership and control.
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of DeAngelo et al. (2010), who also found that both the market timing and life-style theories
played a secondary role, with the primary consideration being the need for short-term cash.
Moreover, the authors found that the lifecycle effect was quantitatively stronger in explaining
the SEO decision when compared to the market timing effect, after finding that a large majority
of firms with potential market timing opportunities, failed to take advantage of them.
Finally, there are those that question the efficacy of announcement effect analysis based on
various arguments. Firstly, the measure of abnormal market returns is subjective with respect
to the benchmark employed. Secondly, announcement effect analysis is framed in such a
manner as to attempt to measure the stock market’s reaction to the announcement,  which is
assumed to be unexpected. If investors had any prior expectation of the announcement
occurring, then the recorded announcement effect surrounding the day of the announcement
would be vastly underestimated (Ritter, 2003). Nonetheless, it is virtually impossible to test the
expectations of the entire market. Thus, a common assumption must be made that these
announcements are indeed unexpected. Thirdly, sometimes the most simple and logical
explanations are overlooked. Basic economics and the law of supply and demand19 predict that
an increase in the supply of a good will lead to a decrease in the price of that good. Thus, the
negative stock market reaction to the issue of new shares, should be at least partially explained
by the law of supply20.
In summary and in light of all the evidence, it is the adverse selection model, which describes
the awareness of investors with respect to the manager’s incentives to issue overvalued equity,
that has emerged as the most prevalent theory in explaining SEOs (Chou & Lin, 2015). There
is a barrier separating the information flow between investors and managers. Hence, even if
managers are issuing shares for no other reason than to raise cash for operational activity,
investors have reasonable doubt regarding the intentions of managers. This reasoning is what
makes the adverse selection model the popular explanation for the market’s generally negative
reaction to SEO announcements. In addition, firms can potentially mitigate these negative
19 The law of demand states that the price of a good increases (decreases) as the quantity demanded of that good
increases (decreases). On the other hand, the law of supply states that the price of a good is negatively related to
the quantity supplied of that good (Gale, 1955).
20 This explanation makes the realistic assumption that the demand for most shares are not inelastic.
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announcement effects by credibly communicating favourable reasoning behind the need for an
equity raise.
It is also important to note that there are numerous, not necessarily mutually exclusive,
motivations for issuing equity that can be broadly summarised into three categories: (1) to
finance investments or operations; (2) to transfer wealth from new shareholders to existing
shareholders; and (3) to increase liquidity for both the firm and the insiders (Kim & Weisbach,
2008). Firms may have different motives for issuing shares but the logic, that a preference
would still exist for issuing shares during periods of high market valuations and robust market
conditions, is difficult to refute.
2.3 SEO	Performance	(The	Long-run	Effects	of	SEOs)	
With the Myers and Majluf (1984) adverse selection model seemingly explaining the negative
announcement effect, the emergence of an overwhelming body of evidence reporting that
markets also reacted negatively to SEOs in the long-run, sparked a wider and more contested
debate.
With prior research focusing on the performance of firms conducting IPOs, the works of
Loughran and Ritter (1995), and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) are amongst the first studies
to comprehensively document the long-run underperformance of issuing firms in comparison
to similar non-issuing firms in the US. Ritter (2003), in summary of a large body of previous
literature, concluded that firms that conducted SEOs had an average return of roughly 72% in
the year before the announcement, which was then followed by an underperformance of
approximately 5% per year in the five years following the equity issuance.
Meanwhile, the body of evidence documenting the remarkable underperformance of SEOs has
since significantly grown in magnitude and the results are not unique to the US, with similar
findings extending to other geographical markets. Levis (1993) studies IPOs and subsequent
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right issues21 conducted by firms in the UK, documenting similar patterns in the investment
performance of SEOs. Kang, Kim and Stulz (1999), investigate the long-run performance of
firms conducting public equity and debt offerings in Japan and find that these firms also
performed poorly, with the exception of firms conducting SEOs through rights offers.
These results  are also not unique to SEOs, but have also been well  documented in research
focusing on IPOs. For instance, Ritter (2003) reports that firms conducting IPOs subsequently
underperform by approximately 7% per year in the five years following the initial listing of the
firm. In fact, the long-run performance of IPOs relative to similar firms has been a phenomenon
that has arguably received more academic attention. Thus, the existing literature heavily
suggests that firms issuing equity underperform in the long-run, whether they are issuing equity
for the first time (IPOs) or issuing new additional shares (SEOs).
There  is  also  evidence  documenting  the  deterioration  in  the  operating  performance  of  firms
following SEOs. McLaughlin, Safieddine and Vasudevan (1996) document the deterioration
of the operating performance of firms conducting SEOs by studying their  median operating
patterns. Loughran and Ritter (1997) investigate the operating performance of SEO firms and
find that SEO firms display significant improvement in operating performance prior to the
SEO, which is then followed by a substantial deterioration in operating performance
subsequent to the offering.
The evidence of this persistent, arguably unexplainable long-run underperformance of SEO
firms has huge behavioural implications and heavily casts doubt on the efficiency of the stock
market. Naturally, these results and their potential implications demanded an explanation.
Thus, two schools of thought have since emerged in an attempt to explain this phenomenon:
(1) those focusing their models on rational explanations under a risk-return framework; and (2)
those focusing their models on behavioural explanations that take into account human
psychology as a major influence behind financial markets.
21 A rights issue, also known as a rights offer, is the offering of new shares to existing shareholders. These new
shares are usually offered at a discounted price.
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2.3.1 Rational	Explanations		
The school of thought based on rational explanations attempts to explain this phenomenon of
SEO long-run underperformance by basing their arguments on fundamentals which are
generally linked to the risk-return framework. Following the argument presented by Fama
(1998), that model misspecification may cause ‘underperformance’, the argument here is quite
simple: if indeed SEO firms underperform in comparison to matching firms, then there must
be an underlying risk that the model used for generating expected returns is failing to capture.
The lower returns for firms conducting SEOs should be as a result of a lower risk level that
investors are faced with. Other rational explanations of poor performance involve the agency
theory which describes the potential value-destroying behaviour of managers.
Fama (1998) raises an interesting argument that SEO underperformance might be as a result of
SEO firms  not  being  evaluated  against  the  correct  benchmark.  For  instance,  several  studies
have found that SEO underperformance is predominantly concentrated in small-growth firms,
which implies that SEO underperformance may be attributed to the deficiencies of asset-pricing
models in valuing these small-growth firms (Brav, Geczy & Gompers, 2000; Mitchell &
Stafford, 2000).
However, Jegadeesh (2000) finds evidence that SEO underperformance persists despite the use
of the best candidates for comparing benchmark returns. The author goes on to demonstrate
that the differences between the underperformance of large- and small-firms conducting SEOs
as documented in previous studies, was simply as a result of the inherent biases in the factor-
model benchmarks used.
Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) find that SEO underperformance persists even after
controlling for firm-size, market-to-book effects, and industry membership. They argue that
although the underperformance of SEO firms may reflect a mismeasurement of risk, it is highly
unlikely that traditional risk measures could explain the magnitude of the risk premium. For
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example, these unknown risk dimensions would have to be able to explain a mean spread that
exceeds 40% over the five-year holding period.
Another  contentious  issue,  other  than  the  selection  of  the  asset  pricing  model,  involves  the
matching firm technique employed. The debate centres on the appropriate matching procedure
used to select the sample of non-issuing firms. This step is vital as the performance of these
non-issuing firms is then used as the benchmark from which to compare the performance of
SEO firms.  Eckbo et al. (2000) argue that the ‘new issues puzzle’ reflects the inadequacy of
the matching-firm technique in providing a suitable control for risk. The authors went on to
develop a six-factor asset pricing model that was able to explain the performance of SEO firms
in their sample. Ritter (2003) reports that matching firms based on the criteria of both size and
market-to-book ratios, as opposed to a simple size match, helps attenuate the differences in
share performance between issuing and non-issuing firms.
The  main  complication  of  the  risk-return  framework  stems  from  the  fact  that  any  test  of
underperformance inevitably becomes a joint test of the model used to generate expected
returns (Eckbo et al., 2000). Thus, rational models began to focus on explaining the reasons
why SEO firms experience less risk and should therefore earn lower returns in comparison to
non-issuing firms. The authors argue that SEO firms face lower systematic risk based on the
following arguments: (1) the leverage hypothesis: issuing equity lowers leverage, which
therefore lowers the firm’s exposure to default risk and unexpected inflation; and (2) the
liquidity hypothesis: issuing equity increases a firm’s share liquidity, thus reducing the firm’s
exposure to liquidity risk.
Lyandres, Sun and Zhang (2005) find evidence in contradiction to the leverage hypothesis after
finding  that  even  after  issuing  equity,  SEO firms  generally  have  higher  leverage  ratios  than
matching non-issuers. However, they do find evidence in support of the liquidity hypothesis,
by showing that issuing firms do tend to have lower liquidity betas than non-issuing firms. In
further support of the liquidity hypothesis, Eckbo and Norli (2005) found that the use of a
liquidity risk factor helped in explaining the ‘new issues puzzle’.
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Another growing avenue of research makes use of real-investment based explanations. These
explanations are centred on real option theory22. Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino (2006)
developed a real option model which argues that firms have a variety of expansionary options
and assets in place before making their decision to issue equity. These growth options are risky,
which explains why SEO firms have high betas prior to the equity issuance.
When a firm decides to issue equity in order to exercise an expansionary option, the firm’s risk
should decrease as the firm is converting the very risky growth options into less risky assets
that are now in place. Even though the new assets in place might be risky, this model argues
that  these assets are still  less risky than the options that  they replace.  The real  option model
highlights the importance of dynamic risk in the asset pricing context as argued by previous
literature (Lewellen & Nagel, 2006). In fact, Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino (2006) found
that using a dynamic beta approach led to SEO underperformance disappearing.
Zhang (2005), drawing inspiration from Cochrane (1991) who first proved the negative
relationship between real investment and expected share returns, argued that investment is the
most likely driving force behind the ‘new issues puzzle’. These findings link perfectly with the
real option model explanation. Lyandres, Sun and Zhang (2005) reported that adding a risk-
factor based on capital investment into the CAPM and the Fama and French (1993) three-factor
model, reduced the magnitude of SEO underperformance, making it largely insignificant.
In a later study, the authors demonstrated evidence that SEO issuing firms invested more than
their non-issuing counterparts (Lyandres, Sun & Zhang, 2008). Many of these rational theories
therefore predict that issuing firms increase investment following their equity issuance and that
there is a negative correlation between the subsequent level of investment and post-issue share
returns (Hertzel & Li, 2010).
22 Real option theory concerns the opportunity of firms to invest, or stop investing, in real assets (McGrath, 1999).
For example, both the choice on whether or not to take on a new project, and the choice on whether or not to stop
a project that the firm is currently involved in, represent a real option to the firm.
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On the contrary, other authors argue that the negative relationship between real investment and
expected returns could be explained by managerial over-investment as a result of empire
building (Titman, Wei & Xie, 2004; Anderson & Garcia-Feijóo, 2006). These explanations are
based on the agency theory models, advanced by Jensen and Meckling (1976), which predicts
that if firms issue equity and in doing so also decrease the management’s shareholdings in the
firm, then this will increase the conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders
(Masulis & Korwar, 1986).
Managers, in pursuit of their own interests, might engage in value destroying behaviour which
includes over-investing and empire building. This behaviour could be the explanation for SEO
underperformance. Jensen (1986) hypothesises that free cash flow23 is likely to be wasted in
operational inefficiencies or wastefully invested in poor projects that destroy firm value, due
to management’s incentives to ‘empire-build’. In line with agency theories McLaughlin,
Safieddine and Vasudevan (1996) report that the decline in profitability of SEO firms is greater
for SEO firms that have higher free cash flows.
Fu (2010) demonstrates that SEO firms have a significant tendency to invest more heavily than
non-issuing firms. In further support of the over-investment hypothesis, the author finds a
negative correlation between post-issue investment levels and subsequent operating
performance.  This overinvestment leads to a reduction in the firm’s asset productivity that is
more severe for firms that have relatively less investment opportunities available. In
contradictory evidence, Lyandres, Sun and Zhang (2005) report that the negative correlation
between investment and returns is more pronounced among issuing firms with stronger
shareholder rights. Firms with stronger shareholder rights should be less susceptible to agency
costs in comparison to firms with weaker shareholder rights.
Finally, and perhaps most controversially, is the literature proposing that the underperformance
of SEOs is as a result of managers manipulating their earnings to attempt to ‘cook-the-books’.
23 Free cash flow, is the cash in excess of that necessary to fund all projects that add value to a firm (Jensen, 1986).
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Essentially this smaller section of the SEO literature accuses the managers of certain issuing
firms of cheating the market. Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998), and Rangan (1998) report that
that the issuers with the highest levels of discretionary accruals, which may be used to enhance
earnings relative to cash flows, demonstrate the worst post-issue share returns. Loughran and
Ritter (1997) interpret their results, documenting the high pre-issue operating performance of
SEOs which was followed by a declining post-issue operating performance, as implying that
some, but not necessarily all, managers are successfully misleading investors.
In summary, although underperformance is highly sensitive to the model specification and
methodology employed, the inconsistencies in predictions and evidence across the rational
explanation models, leaves a lot to be desired.  Simply claiming the possibility that unknown
risk dimensions are not being taken into account,  does not appear to be an adequate enough
explanation for SEO underperformance, considering the magnitude of the risk premium which
would have to be explained. Furthermore, the undeniable rise of behavioural finance seems to
open up a door that cannot be closed. Surely, if rational models fail in explaining this
phenomenon,  then  investor  and  managerial  psychology  must  play  a  role.  Rational  models
cannot avoid the burden of proof by simply speculating on the existence of an unknown risk
factor. A reliable model, capturing and describing the return profile of issuing firms would go
a long way in increasing the credibility of this argument.
Nonetheless, these rational explanations cannot be ignored either. The persistence of the
issuing-firm underperformance for five years may naturally indicate some implications about
the risk of SEO firms. The main behavioural argument, as discussed in the next section, centres
on the over-optimism of investors who are then too sluggish in adjusting their opinions
correctly to the news of the SEO. Investors may not behave in a completely rational manner,
but it would be extremely difficult to imagine how the stock market could take such long
periods, even reaching up to five years, to correctly adjust their predictions and opinions with
respect to SEO firms. Therefore, surely there must be at least some element of risk involved in
explaining the long-run performance of SEOs?
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2.3.2 Behavioural	Explanations	
Although the market timing theory explains the initial negative response to SEOs, the
persistence of this underperformance for periods extending up to five years after the SEO, has
brought many authors to question whether the initial market reaction to SEO announcements
is unbiased (Loughran & Ritter, 1995). The authors argue that the SEO firm’s equity remains
highly overvalued when the issue occurs because market participants do not correctly re-
evaluate the shares in question. Eckbo et al.  (2000)  also  argue  that  the  long-run
underperformance of SEOs suggests that the market essentially underreacts to the SEO
announcements.
These findings cast doubt on the validity of the classical assumption of market efficiency and
has led to the development of behavioural models in efforts to explain this phenomenon. These
models argue that the psychology of market participants, which has been largely ignored by
the rational explanations, can play a significant role in explaining many anomalies, including
SEO underperformance. The main behavioural explanation for the underperformance of SEOs
amongst the majority of research seems to be that investors and managers are over-optimistic
about the prospects of the issuing firm. This leads to misvaluations, which create the
opportunities and incentive for managers to attempt to time the market. Thus, over-optimism
and  the  market  timing  theory  seem  to  go  hand-in-hand.  This  is  not  to  say  that  only  over-
optimism may lead to the misvaluation of shares.
Loughran and Ritter (1997) propose that investors place too much weight on the past
performance of the firm and less weight on more recent events. SEO firms have been shown to
have increased profitability and exceptional share performance leading up to the equity issue,
which is consistent with the predictions of the market timing theory. Investors seemingly
overweight this recent performance, which is seen as ‘good news’, and seem to therefore also
underreact to the SEO announcement, which is generally viewed as ‘bad news’. It is even
argued that investors place too much weight on their own private assessments rather than being
more responsive to market signals (Daniel, Hirshleifer & Subrahmanyam, 1998).
28
This over-optimism may create a self-perpetuating cycle of underperformance. Considering
that investors under-react to the SEO announcement, it could imply that the market is still
overvaluing the firm’s equity and therefore possibly encouraging management to issue more
equity in an attempt to continue timing the market. This would serve to exasperate the
underperformance of issuing firms (Daniel et al., 1998). Numerous studies have shown that it
is not uncommon for a single firm to make multiple equity issuances, even within the same
year (Lyandres, Sun & Zhang, 2008).
In addition to the several studies highlighting the importance of market timing considerations
in the decision to issue equity as discussed in Section 2.2, there is a large body of evidence in
support of the predictions set forth by the market timing theory in explaining the long-run
performance of SEOs. There are numerous studies that provide evidence of the significance of
investor over-optimism in the long-run performance of SEOs. For instance, Loughran and
Ritter (1995) demonstrate that the SEO firms that issue equity during periods of high issuing
activity substantially underperform, whereas the firms issuing equity during periods of low
issuing activity barely underperform at all.
These results were echoed by Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995), who also find evidence
consistent with market timing after arguing that the long-run underperformance of SEO firms
is  as  a  result  of  investors  inadequately  responding  to  the  information  conveyed  in  the  SEO
announcements in a timely manner. Investor over-optimism is further highlighted in the
literature documenting the pre-issue outperformance of issuing firms as findings show that
issuers are generally firms with excellent share performance prior to issuance (Ritter, 2003).
Another way of gauging investor over-optimism is to study the behaviour of insiders24 during
the issuing process, as well as the market’s reaction to the earnings announcements of issuing
firms following the issuance. Teoh et al. (1998) study the predictions and subsequent
realisations of earnings announcements around the SEO and find evidence that investors are
too optimistic about the earning prospects of SEO firms.
24 Generally, any employee, director or owner of a firm who has access to material, non-public information.
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Jegadeesh (2000) studied the four-day earnings announcement window of SEO firms following
the issue in order to gauge whether investors were disappointed or not with regards to the actual
earnings revealed in the announcement in comparison to their predictions. The results showed
that SEOs underperformed by approximately twice as much during these earnings
announcement periods than they did outside of these periods. The author concluded that this
severe underperformance indicated disappointed investors who were over-optimistic about the
long-term  prospects  of  issuing  firms  at  the  time  of  issuance.  Dennis  and  Sarin  (2001)  also
reported significantly negative earnings announcement effects from the second quarter
following the SEO until three years afterwards.
Clarke, Dunbar and Kahle (2001) find that issuing firms, on average, significantly
underperform over five years when their  shares are sold by insiders.  However,  they find no
significant underperformance for issuing firms when their shares are sold by non-insiders.
Insiders are assumed to have more information with regard to the firm and its appropriate value
than non-insiders. Therefore, the selling of shares by these insiders prior to the issuing firm’s
severe  long-run  underperformance,  is  consistent  with  insiders  selling  their  shares  for
opportunistic reasons. This adds further support to the ‘window of opportunity’ hypothesis.
Managers may also be over-optimistic, given the recent share performance of the firm prior to
the SEO. This may lead to managerial hubris and subsequent over-investment which might
also explain the underperformance of SEO firms (Heaton, 2002). A distinction must be made
between the over-optimism of managers leading to over-investment (a behavioural
explanation) and the agency costs that describe the rational incentives for managers to engage
in empire-building, which may also lead to over-investment as described in Section 2.3.1. In
essence, managers may deliberately or as a result of excessive optimism engage in value-
destroying behaviour.
In contrast to the predictions set out by the market timing theory, Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996)
studied the decision between debt and equity and found that future excess share returns played
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no significant role in determining the type of issue.  However,  both a firm’s market-to-book
ratio and prior excess returns played a significant role in the issuing decision. Lyandres, Sun
and Zhang (2005) cast some level of doubt on the market timing hypothesis after finding that
there is no significantly negative cross-sectional relationship between SEOs and future share
returns after controlling for both size and market-to-book ratios.
Mahajan and Tartatoglu (2008) study SEOs conducted in G-7 countries25 and find evidence
that contradicts the market timing theory. The authors found that in all seven countries, with
the exception of Japan, both the effect of issuing equity and the effect that attempting to time
the market has on leverage, was temporary. The authors argued that these results were more in
line with the dynamic trade-off model and inconsistent with the market timing hypothesis.
Overall, these findings seem to challenge the concept of market efficiency as informed
investors have the possibility to earn superior returns by capitalising on the underreaction and
overreaction of naïve investors, without having to take on additional risk. In order to test for
the market timing theory, models require a proxy that indicates periods where shares are
overvalued. Although measures such as market-to-book ratios and previous abnormal returns
serve as popular proxies used to indicate market timing opportunities, these measures are not
without their flaws (as discussed in Section 3.1). In response, measures of investor sentiment
has become the focus of many behavioural studies attempting to examine the credibility of the
market timing theory. Investor sentiment is arguably a more direct and improved measure in
indicating investor over-optimism.
Naturally, various authors began by dedicating their research to investigating the impact of
investor sentiment on share prices, with literature as early as Keynes (1936) considering the
possibility that the influence of investors driven by sentiment could cause prices to deviate
from fundamentals.  It has been well documented that investor sentiment does indeed influence
and help predict share returns in both the short-run (Kaniel, Saar & Titman, 2008) and also in
the long-run (Brown & Cliff, 2004). In order for sentiment to influence the markets, and for
25 Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US.
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the deviation from fundamentals to persist over extended periods of time, there must also be
constraints on arbitrage that limit rational arbitrators from fully exploiting the mispricing
(Baker & Wurgler, 2006).
Building on the work of Yuan (2008) who provided empirical evidence that sentiment-driven
investors are more active and trade more aggressively during periods of high-sentiment,  Yu
and Yuan (2011) argue that: (1) sentiment traders influence the market to a greater extent
during periods of high-sentiment; and (2) these investors that trade based on their sentiment
are inexperienced and naïve. Thus, periods of high-investor sentiment could disrupt the positive
risk-return relationship in the stock market as the authors go on to prove. Using the investor
sentiment index developed by Baker and Wurgler (2006), the authors show that while the
mean-variance relationship is positive during periods of low-investor sentiment, the
relationship demonstrates little, if any, significant correlation when investor sentiment levels
are high.  The authors also find evidence that shares are generally overvalued during periods
of high sentiment as over-optimism causes investors to bid up the price of shares.
A clear presumption made by many of these studies is that sentiment-driven investors are naïve
and  tend  to  have  an  inferior  understanding  of  how  to  measure  risk,  and  are  therefore  more
predisposed to miscalculating the variance of expected returns (Yu & Yuan, 2011). Given that
during  high-sentiment  periods  shares  are  more  likely  to  be  overvalued,  it  would  also  make
sense that more firms would issue equity during these periods in an attempt to take advantage
of the window of opportunity. Chou and Lin (2015) find that small and young firms have a
higher probability of issuing equity during periods of high sentiment,  also implying that  the
effects of investor sentiment is stronger for smaller, younger firms. This would make sense, as
these firms are more likely to be influenced by investor sentiment and might also face more
constraints on arbitrage. For example, small shares might face greater liquidity challenges than
larger shares, which could prevent arbitrage from taking place and thus allowing the mispricing
to persist.
Chou and Lin (2015) further report  that:  (1) firms that  conduct SEOs during high-sentiment
periods experience less negative abnormal returns surrounding the issuing day, vis-à-vis firms
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that conduct SEOs during low-sentiment periods; and (2) firms conducting SEOs during high-
sentiment periods also experience more severe long-run underperformance.
In summary, the behavioural theories argue that SEO long-run underperformance is explained
by investor and managerial over-optimism. Market participants appear to place too much
emphasis  on  the  past  performance  of  SEO firms  and  are  too  slow in  reacting  to  the  current
market signals. These models raise a strong challenge to market efficiency as they allow for
persistent deviations from fundamentals. The main challenge faced by behavioural finance is
the difficulty in ‘measuring’ the psychology of market participants and therefore, the difficulty
in developing a model that explains all behavioural biases. As a result of the shortage in
empirical behavioural models that can be tested, behavioural theories generally require the use
of rational models to aid in testing its predictions.  For example, even behavioural studies
measure deviations from expected returns using asset pricing models. Therefore, many
behavioural models are by definition exposed to the same joint-hypothesis and model-
specification issues that plague the rational models.
2.4 The	South	African	Literature		
A major motivation behind this study was the lack of research conducted in South Africa with
respect to the long-run performance of SEO firms. Instead, much of the existing, relevant South
African literature focuses on IPOs and the capital structure decision as a whole. In line with
international evidence, South African studies have also found evidence of IPO
underperformance on the JSE (Page, 1997; M’Kombe & Ward, 2002; Chipeta & Jardine,
2014). Therefore, even though the topic of SEOs has been largely ignored in the South African
context, it might be a reasonable assumption to assume that the international patterns found
surrounding SEOs would also be found in the South African context as the international
evidence suggests that similar trends that are found in IPOs, are generally also found in SEOs.
Auret and Britten (2008) examine the post-issue operating performance of IPOs on the JSE and
found that issuing firms experienced an increase in their profitability (as captured by returns
on assets) leading up to the IPO which was then followed by significant declines in profitability
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in the third year subsequent to the IPO. The authors cited their findings as evidence in support
of the market timing theory and the possible tendency of managers to over-invest.
Chipeta and Jardine (2014) report findings of a significantly negative relationship between the
volume of IPOs and long-run performance, as well a significantly negative relationship
between pre-IPO revenue forecasts and subsequent post-issue operating performance. The
authors argue that these findings suggest that the IPO market in South Africa is affected by the
‘fads and over-optimism’ theory suggested by Ritter (1991)26.
Finally, Dalika and Seetharam (2015) further highlight the importance of investor sentiment in
the South African context, by providing evidence that investor sentiment has a strong impact
on share returns on the JSE. Their results suggests that during low-sentiment periods, shares
that are more sensitive to sentiment27 experience higher returns, a pattern that fully reverses in
periods of high sentiment. The authors measure investor sentiment using the investor sentiment
index developed by Baker and Wurgler (2006), which they adapt to the JSE28.
2.5 Summary	of	the	Literature		
This chapter ultimately provides the theoretical background that has gone on to inspire and
heavily influence this study. Firstly, Chapter 2 begins with a brief review of the capital structure
literature which has laid the foundation for the advancement of the SEO literature. Secondly, a
review of the SEO literature appears to demonstrate two common patterns: (1) markets
generally react negatively to SEO announcements in the short-run; and (2) SEO firms generally
underperform in the long-run. While the negative announcement effects, describing the short-
run performance of SEO firms, appear to be well explained by the adverse selection model set
forth by Myers and Majluf (1984), the long-run underperformance of SEO firms, for periods
26 Ritter (1991) argued that the patterns in the US IPO market were consistent with investors being over-optimistic
with respect to the earnings potential of young, growth firms. This over-optimism creates a ‘window of
opportunity’ for managers to take advantage of.
27 These shares include: smaller shares, growth shares, high volatility shares, and younger shares.
28 The investor sentiment index, as well as the four variables used to formulate the index, are discussed in greater
detail in Sections 3.1 and 4.2.1.
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reaching up to five years post-issuance, has sparked a literary debate that appears far from
being resolved. Opinions are divided between the rational and behavioural explanations for this
phenomenon known as the ‘new issues puzzle’. Rational models argue that this phenomenon
should be explained by risk or by the potentially value-destroying behaviour of managers as a
results of agency costs. Behavioural theories, spearheaded by the market timing theory,
describe the over-optimism of investors and managers as the catalysis for this phenomenon.
Ultimately, there appears to be no real consensus in explaining the long-run performance of
issuing firms as the ‘puzzle’ remains unsolved.
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3 Theoretical	Motivations	for	the	Empirical	Framework	
This chapter aims to describe the key literature that has aided several of the crucial
methodological decisions made in this study. Given the wide range of existing literature, there
are various contentious issues and inconsistencies in academic opinion with respect to studying
the performance of SEO firms. Various aspects of this study were therefore selected based on
the discretion afforded by the contribution of the existing literature. This chapter, in
conjunction with the literature described in Chapter 2, aims to justify and motivate the decisions
behind the methodology described in Chapter 4, whilst also serving to highlight the robustness
of the comprehensive methodology applied in this study.
3.1 Measuring	Investor	Sentiment	
The market timing theory is based on the precept that managers are able to decipher between
whether their firm’s shares are overvalued or undervalued. Therefore, in order to test the
predictions and implications of the market timing theory, a method of testing for the mispricing
of shares is required. Based on the existing literature, it appears that the market-to-book ratio,
the pre-issue abnormal returns, and the post-issue abnormal returns are among the most
prevalent gauges of share mispricing, which can serve to highlight a window of opportunity
for managers wishing to time the market29.  However, these measures have a major flaw in that
they might not necessarily indicate mispricing (DeAngelo et al., 2010).
For instance, Hertzil and Li (2010) illustrate how market-to-book ratios can be decomposed
into two separate growth option and mispricing components. Moreover, measuring post-issue
and  pre-issue  abnormal  returns  may be  problematic  as  the  estimation  of  ‘normal  returns’  is
highly subjective to the asset pricing model implemented by the researcher (Fama, 1998).
Not only are these measures problematic, there is also substantial evidence documenting their
limited aptitude in predicting a firm’s SEO decisions. For instance, DeAngelo et al. (2010)
29 For example, see Baker and Wurgler (2002).
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report that the majority of firms conducting SEOs in their comprehensive sample are not firms
with either high market-to-book ratios, high past returns, or low future returns.
Other popular measures of investor sentiment such as the Chicago Board Options Exchange
volatility index (VIX index)30 and the Put-Call-Ratio31 (PCR)  have  been  shown  to  have
significant flaws and cause for questioning. For instance, Kumar and Persaud (2002) argue that
the VIX index could just as likely be signalling changes in the market’s underlying risk itself,
as it could be signalling changes in the attitude of investors towards risk; two distinct
phenomena that cannot be separated.
In addition to the shortcomings of using the VIX index, the data restrictions in the South
African  direct  equivalent,  known  as  the  South  African  Volatility  Index  (SAVI),  is  also  an
important consideration. Since its introduction, the index has become a popular measure of
investor sentiment in South Africa (Koetze, Joseph & Oosthuizen, 2009). Unfortunately, the
SAVI was only introduced in 2007 and therefore falls rather short in covering the entire sample
period of this study.
In response to the many of the above mentioned criticisms, the investor sentiment index
developed by Baker and Wurgler (2006) has emerged as a popular tool used to test many
behavioural  theories.  Periods of high sentiment as indicated by the index, is  often used as a
more reliable indication of a window of opportunity for managers to time the market. An
additional benefit of using the investor sentiment index is that it makes use of a combination
of various measures used to proxy investor sentiment, as well as offering the flexibility to adapt
the index to different stock exchanges as illustrated in Section 4.2.1.
In conclusion and in light of the existing literature, this study measures investor sentiment by
implementing the yearly investor sentiment index developed by Baker and Wurgler (2006),
with additional adjustments made in adapting the index to the South African context in light of
30 An index measuring the implied volatility of the S&P 500 index options.
31 Measured as the ratio of puts outstanding to calls outstanding.
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the recent findings of Dalika and Seetharam (2015). The investor sentiment index is generally
accepted, in theory, as the most robust measure of investor sentiment. Other popular measures
that indicate potential over-valuation of equity as a result of investor sentiment (namely the
market-to-book ratio and prior abnormal share returns) are used in the regression models,
which analyse the potential influences on a firm’s decision to conduct a SEO as discussed in
the next section.
3.2 Examining	a	Firm’s	SEO	Decision	
This section briefly describes the logit regression analysis undertaken in this study, which was
based on the work of Chou and Lin (2015). The aim of these regression models are to analyse
the influences of a firm’s decision on whether or not to issue shares with the following
explanatory variables employed: (1) Investor sentiment32; (2) market-to-book ratios; (3) prior
abnormal share returns; (4) future share returns; and (5) age.
All of these variables have been found in previous literature to be significant predictors of a
firm’s decision to issue equity. For example, Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996) reported that prior
abnormal returns and the market-to-book ratio of the firms, at the time of conducting the SEO,
are significant determinants of SEOs. DeAngelo et al. (2010) find a significant relationship
between the probability of conducting a SEO and common measures of mispricing,  such as
pre-issue abnormal returns, market-to-book ratios, and the age of a firm. Chou and Lin (2015)
find that all the variables used in the logit regression mentioned above generally demonstrate
a significant influence on a firm’s probability of conducting a SEO.
3.3 Explaining	the	Market’s	Reaction	to	SEO	Announcements		
This section discusses the explanatory variables that could potentially aid in explaining the
market’s reaction to SEO announcements. Besides the potential for investor sentiment to
influence the market’s reaction, the characteristics of the firm issuing the equity, as well as the
32 As measured using the investor sentiment index discussed in Section 3.1 and 4.2.1
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details revealed in the SEO announcement, also have the potential ability to significantly
impact the market’s reaction.
In particular this study makes use of four explanatory variables used in the regression analysis
aimed at further explaining the market’s reaction to SEOs: (1) the issuing firm’s size; (2) the
firm’s Tobin’s Q-ratio; (3) the age of a firm (proxied by the number of years that the firm has
been listed on the JSE); and (4) the size of the issue relative to the size of the issuing firm. The
theoretical motivations for these choices are mentioned below.
A firm’s characteristics could potentially influence the ability of a firm to time the market and
subsequently influence the market’s perception of the SEO announcement. Evidence suggests
that investor sentiment has a stronger influence on firms that are subject to more severe
arbitrage constraints (Baker & Wurgler, 2006). These firms are arguably more susceptible to
misvaluations thereby increasing the incentive for the managers of these firms to time the
market.
The adverse selection model set out by Myers and Majluf (1984) predicts that investors could
potentially be more sceptical of the SEO announcements of these firms leading to a more
severely negative response. For example, Chou and Lin (2015) find that smaller and younger
firms have a higher probability of conducting an equity issue during periods of high-investor
sentiment. These findings highlight the potential influence of a firm’s size and age on the
market’s response to SEO announcements.
This study takes a similar approach used by Chou and Lin (2015) in proxying a firm’s age with
the number of years that the firm has been listed on the JSE. This proxy, as opposed to using a
firm’s actual age, has the benefit of adding an extra measure of investor familiarity with the
firm in question. Investors are more likely to recognise a firm that has been listed on the JSE
for a longer period of time, given the availability of public information with regard to the firm’s
‘track record’. Investors are perhaps even more likely to trust a firm that has been listed for a
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longer period of time, or at least be able to make a more informed decision in forming their
response to the SEO announcement.
Investors do not only fear that managers are issuing shares in order to time the market, but they
also worry about the intentions of the managers with respect to the use of the funds. Markets
might exhibit less negative reactions when a firm is able to convince the market of a positive
reason for issuing the new shares (Ritter, 2003). Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996) offer evidence
that markets react less negatively to the announcements of firms that appear to demonstrate
good investment opportunities, as indirectly measured by a firm’s Tobin’s Q-ratio. Naturally,
the firm’s intended use of funds and the issue size may further influence the market’s reaction.
In contrast to these opinions, Barclay and Litzenberger (1988) find that neither the intended
use of the proceeds, the size of the issue, nor the estimated profitability of the firm’s planned
investment (also proxied by the firm’s Tobin’s Q-ratio), have any significant correlation with
the announcement effect.
Due to the lack of literature in the South African context with regards to SEOs, this study was
indebted to explore the potential relationships of these various influences on SEO
announcement effects. Regrettably, the majority of SEO announcements lacked sufficient
details to appropriately categorise SEO announcements based on the intended use of funds.
Hence, the intended use of funds was not examined as an explanatory variable in the regression
analysis conducted in this study.
3.4 Selecting	the	Firm	Matching	Procedure	
The procedure used to match issuing firms to similar non-issuing firms is crucial. Fortunately,
the literature seems to be relatively consistent and harmonious in this regard. An overview of
the literature reveals two clear frontrunners: (1) a size-matching procedure; and (2) a style-
matching procedure.
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The size-matching procedure simply relies on matching two firms based on their proximity in
size. Despite the simplicity of this approach it has been widely used, even in more recent
literature  (Lyandres,  Sun  &  Zhang,  2008).  However,  there  is  a  growing  body  of  evidence
documenting the relative superiority of the style-matching procedure, which matches firms on
the basis of both their size and market-to-book ratios.
Ritter (2003), demonstrated how matching firms simply based on size introduced confounding
effects. He found that issuing firms were mainly growth firms33, while non-issuers tended to
be value firms34. Therefore, previous literature comparing issuing firms with non-issuing firms
that were matched by size were also potentially comparing value firms with growth firms by
extension, which highlights the added benefits of matching firms by both size and market-to-
book ratios. Hertzel and Li (2010), echoing the findings of Ritter (2003), documented that
adding the market-to-book ratio in the matching procedure significantly diminished the
difference in underperformance of industrial issuing firms relative to their non-issuing
counterparts.
Despite the developments of more complex matching procedures, the two aforementioned
approaches are the most popular matching procedures amongst academics. Attempts to match
firms on additional characteristics, such as pre-issue investment to asset ratios (Carlson, Fisher
& Giammarino, 2006) and industry clustering (Spiess & Affleck-Graves, 1995), have not really
caught on and represent the exceptions more so than the rule. Therefore, this study makes use
of both the size-matched and style-matched procedures in support of the existing body of
literature.
	
33 Firms whose shares tend to trade at a higher price relative to fundamentals. For instance, firms with high-
market-to-book ratios.
34 Firms whose shares tend to trade at a lower price relative to fundamentals. For example, firms with low market-
to-book ratios.
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3.5 Measuring	Long-run	Performance		
The majority of the literary debate centres on the differences in methodological ideologies
regarding the measuring of a firm’s long-run performance. Firstly, existing literature seemingly
focuses on either the operating performance or the share price performance of SEOs, with very
few studies simultaneously exploring both in the same body of work. This study
comprehensively tests both a firm’s share performance (market-based performance) and a
firm’s operating performance (accounting-based performance). Both measures of performance
reveal different facets of a firm’s financial performance (Chetty, Naidoo & Seetharam, 2015).
Whilst accounting-based measures reflect the historical aspects of a firm’s financial
performance (McGuire, Schneewies & Hill, 1986), market-based measures reflect the forward-
looking aspects of a firm’s financial performance. Whilst there appears to be a general
consensus with respect to measuring the operating performance of a firm, the correct approach
to measuring a firm’s share price performance remains a fiercely debated issue.
3.5.1 Measuring	Share	Price	Performance		
The measure of a share’s long-run performance is arguably the most contentious issue across
the SEO literature. Therefore, for complete transparency, this section comprehensively
discusses the relevant literature and motivations behind the approaches selected in this study
to evaluate long-run share performance.   Ritter (2003) summarises the general sentiment with
regards to this challenge in concluding that the abnormal performance of issuing firms is highly
sensitive to both the methodology undertaken and the sample used.  Indeed, there are countless
cases of authors reaching completely different conclusions based on alternative methodologies.
If there was indeed consensus on this matter, then perhaps this phenomenon would not be
referred to as the ‘new issues puzzle’.
Arguably, the most common measure of share performance across the SEO literature is the use
of a simple buy-and-hold return approach. One of the major criticisms of this approach is its
utter disregard for risk. Simple buy-and-hold returns do not factor in that issuing and non-
issuing firms could very well have completely different risk profiles. Therefore, these firms
could naturally demonstrate a different return profile, assuming the realisation of the rational
risk-return framework set out in traditional finance.
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Another popular model that does employ a benchmark, is the buy-and-hold abnormal market
returns approach. The firm’s long-run performance is measured as its cumulative deviations
from the returns of the market. Again, the major criticism of this model is its failure to correctly
account for risk, as the returns are merely compared with the returns of the market, without any
further attention paid to risk.  Despite this major criticism, the buy-and-hold return approach
and the buy-and-hold abnormal return approach remain popular measures of share performance
in the existing literature. Perhaps this is because these approaches avoid the joint-hypothesis
problem which is discussed in the next paragraph.
In response to the literature arguing in support for the importance of risk considerations, some
researchers  propose  the  use  of  an  asset  pricing  model  that  predicts  expected  returns,  which
should then be used as the benchmark for actual returns. The most popular asset pricing models,
such as the CAPM and the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, emerged as the
commonly used candidates to generate these benchmark expected returns. The main concern
with this approach is the inevitable joint-hypothesis problem. Any test for abnormal returns
aimed at  testing  for  deviations  from expected  returns,  also  becomes  a  joint  test  of  the  asset
pricing model used to generate these expected returns (Eckbo et al., 2000).
To make matters worse, the choice of asset pricing model is a highly contentious issue in its
own right. Whilst the aim of this study is not to make a direct comment on the asset pricing
environment in South Africa, it is important to take note of the inconsistent empirical evidence
across the international asset pricing literature, which on a whole fails to universally support
the use of any specific asset pricing model. For example, the emergence of the well-
documented size effects, value effects, and momentum effects cast a huge shadow of doubt on
the ability of the CAPM to adequately predict returns35. These findings are not unique to the
CAPM, as asset pricing remains a puzzle in itself. The emergence of behavioural finance has
introduced even more doubt on the previously held notion that behaviour of stock market
participants could always be described as rational.
35 For example, see Banz (1981), Reinganum (1981), Rosenberg, Reid and Lanstein (1985), Fama and French
(1992), and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993).
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Moreover, one must note the relevant literature that comprehensively documents the challenges
associated with obtaining unbiased inferences when measuring buy-and-hold returns and
cumulative abnormal returns (Lyandres, Sun & Zhang, 2005). For example, Fama (1998)
argues that ‘bad-model’ problems are most prevalent when calculating long-run buy-and-hold
abnormal returns, as any of the model’s difficulties in explaining short-term returns are
compounded36. Barber and Lyon (1997) demonstrate that bid-ask ‘bounce’ can lead to a
rebalancing bias when examining the equally-weighted returns of a portfolio. In essence, every
time the portfolio is rebalanced, less weight is put on the shares that have had positive returns
(traded last at the ask price) and more weight is put on the shares that have declined in price
(traded last at the bid price).
A prevalent solution to these various challenges, is the use of factor regression models to
examine abnormal long-run share performance. However, this method is usually used in
conjunction with the more traditional, albeit problematic, aforementioned measures of share
performance. Moreover, across the more recent SEO literature, the buy-and-hold abnormal
return approach is a more popular method for measuring long-run share performance than the
cumulative abnormal return approach.  Fama (1998) argues that the long-term experience of
an investor is more accurately captured by obtaining long-run buy-and-hold returns than by
obtaining cumulative abnormal returns. The author further argues that the cumulative abnormal
returns approach fails to accurately measure the long-run returns received by an investor who
holds a security for a long post-event period. The buy-and-hold abnormal returns approach also
helps avoid the problems associated with frequent transactions (Barber & Lyon, 1997).
Finally, a majority of the literature uses both an equally-weighted approach and a value-
weighted approach when measuring the long-run performance of either individual shares or a
portfolio of shares. Although the simpler equally-weighted approach is more popular, the
value-weighted approach is typically seen as a robustness measure for comparing results. For
36 Fama (1998) describes the ‘bad-model’ problem as the problems experienced by all models of expected returns,
which is as a result of their limitation in describing the complete description of the patterns of average returns
during any sample period.
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instance, Fama (1998) argues that many of the anomalies documented in the literature are
severely reduced in magnitude and even disappear when using a value-weighted approach,
instead of an equally-weighted approach. The author also argues that the value-weighted
approach provides a better representation of the wealth effect of investors. Hertzel and Li
(2010) demonstrate that using a value-weighted return approach, instead of an equally-
weighted approach, significantly attenuated the underperformance of industrial SEOs.
In summary, the selection of an appropriate benchmark is subjective and ultimately bears a
vital influence in the results of any analysis. In light of the literature, this study makes use of
three share performance measures: (1) simple buy-and-hold returns; (2) buy-and-hold
abnormal returns, with share returns compared to market returns as the benchmark; and (3)
buy-and-hold abnormal returns, with the realised share returns compared to their expected
returns as predicted by the CAPM. As mentioned above, although these measures are in no
way perfect, they do represent the most popular measures across the literature. For robustness
and in response to the documented flaws of these measures, this study also implemented factor
regression models to evaluate long-run share performance in addition to using both an equally-
weighted and value-weighted approach for all the aforementioned share performance measures.
3.5.2 Measuring	Operating	Performance		
Measuring the operating performance of a firm is a much simpler task when compared to the
challenges of measuring share performance. Although, there are contentions regarding the best
accounting measures of a firm’s operating performance, this study makes use of arguably the
three most popular accounting measures in the SEO literature: (1) earnings per share (EPS)37;
(2) return on assets (ROA)38; and (3) return on equity (ROE)39.
All three of these accounting ratios are commonly used in literature as empirical measures of a
firm’s profitability. For instance, Auret and Britten (2008) measured the profitability of IPO
firms  listed  on  the  JSE using  ROA,  whilst  Chipeta  and  Jardine  (2014)  used  both  ROA and
37 The monetary amount of a firm’s annual profits (or net income) attributable to each outstanding ordinary share.
38 The annual earnings attributed to ordinary shareholders divided by total assets.
39 The annual earnings attributed to ordinary shareholders divided by the total book value of equity.
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ROE. Chetty, Naidoo and Seetharam (2015) studied the effect of corporate social responsibility
on the financial performance of firms listed on the JSE, and used all three accounting measures
as a proxy for firm profitability.
The objective here is to examine the effect of the equity issuance on the operating performance
of the issuing firms, therefore comparative operating performance is not measured on an
absolute basis but instead, the year-on-year percentage changes are compared. Following the
contribution of DeAngelo (1988) documenting the skewness of various accounting ratios, it is
common across the literature to examine the median values of these accounting ratios.
3.6 Sample	Selection	Criteria	
This section briefly discusses the theory behind the relatively stringent selection criteria
described in this study. Firstly, and in line with the majority of the existing body of research,
firms  belonging  to  the  financial  and  utility  sectors  are  excluded.   Firms  belonging  to  these
sectors seem to operate in different manners and under unique conditions,  and are therefore
excluded from the sample. For example, financial firms have been shown to have extremely
high leverage ratios that may distort accounting ratios (Loughran & Ritter, 1997), whilst utility
firms are often governed under different regulations, which may influence management’s
ability to time the market (Eckbo & Masulis, 1992). Due to the unique intricacies of these
firms, they are likely to experience a different market reaction subsequent to issuing new
shares,  and  are  therefore  excluded  from the  sample.  In  addition,  the  aim of  this  study  is  to
specifically study the performance of firms that  invest  in real  assets,  hence the exclusion of
financial firms.
Secondly, since the focus of this study is on the issuing of new shares for cash, mixed security
offerings and rights offers are excluded. This is not unique to this study and is in line with the
majority of the existing SEO literature. Mixed security offerings are excluded as it is virtually
impossible to decipher the contribution of each security to the overall market’s reaction to the
mixed security offering. Rights offers are excluded because they are only made to existing
shareholders and at a discounted price, which naturally leads to a downward price pressure
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following the rights offer announcement. While this can be factored into the analysis, a further
complication arises from the manner in which rights offers are conducted in South Africa.
Firms commonly make the announcement of a rights-offer in multiple stages, first announcing
only the intention to conduct the rights-offer, and then finalising the rights offer’s details
(which may also occur through more than one announcement). This makes it extremely
difficult to correctly analyse the market’s reaction to a firm’s rights-offer announcement as
new information is potentially only released through different announcements over time.
Finally, firms that make multiple issues are included in the sample in line with the methodology
employed by Lyandres, Sun and Zhang (2008), who showed that their results were robust to
the exclusion of these firms. In light of the inconsistencies in the literature with regards to
dealing with firms that  make multiple announcements,  the analysis undertaken in this study
also tests for robustness by excluding firms that make multiple announcements within a five-
year period.
3.7 Summary	of	the	Theoretical	Motivations		
This chapter motivates and clarifies the decision-making process behind the methodological
exploits of this study in order to provide total transparency. Firstly, it highlights the advantages
of measuring investor sentiment using the yearly investor sentiment index developed by Baker
and Wurgler (2006), with the adaptation of the index to the JSE by Dalika and Seetharam
(2015). Secondly, a theoretical motivation is given for the selection of the explanatory variables
used in the two distinct regression models: (1) describing a firm’s decision to conduct a SEO;
and (2) describing the market’s initial reaction to the SEO announcements. Thirdly, the firm
matching  procedure  is  discussed  which  details  the  popular  size-,  and  style-matching
approaches that were selected in this study. Fourthly, the comprehensive measures of both the
long-run market performance and the long-run operating performance of firms are discussed.
Finally,  the  theoretical  motivation  for  the  stringent  sample  selection  criteria  applied  in  this
study is discussed.
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4 Data	and	Methodology	
This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section describes the data collection
process as well as the sample selection criteria. The second section describes the overall
research design, detailing the empirical models undertaken in this study. The third section
discusses the limitations of this study as well as underlining the future avenues for research.
The methodology for this study has been based on the methodologies undertaken by Loughran
and Ritter (1995; 1997), Baker and Wurgler (2006), and Chou and Lin (2015), with additional
considerations based on the work of Dalika and Seetharam (2015).
4.1 Sample	and	Data	Collection	
SEO announcements were found using the INET BFA Expert data base, which has a record of
all the relevant Stock Exchange News Service (SENS) announcements40 for all listed and
delisted41 firms on the JSE during the period of 1998 to 2015. The following keywords were
used in the search: accelerated book-build, equity raises, new ordinary shares, and new shares.
The sample period does not precede 1998 due to restrictions in the availability and reliability
of the announcements prior to 1998. Only announcements relating solely to the issue of new
shares for cash are included in the sample. Rights-offers and mixed security offerings are
excluded.
As detailed earlier, financial and utility firms were excluded from the sample. Firms that make
multiple issues within a five-year period were included in the sample42, and if a firm does make
multiple announcements within a five-year period, the first announcement is used.  Share price
data, firm characteristics, accounting ratios, and the inputs for the asset pricing model were
gathered  from the  INET BFA Expert  database  as  well  as  from the  Findata@Wits  database.
Finally,  the  analysis  in  this  study  involves  the  common  assumption  that  the  SEO
40 The JSE’s SENS announcements provide the public with access to material announcements made by firms.
41 Henceforth, delisted firms are included in the sample in order to avoid survivorship biases.
42 For robustness, the results are also examined after excluding firms that make multiple announcements within a
five-year period.
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announcements collected represent the release of new, previously unexpected information to
the public.
4.2 Description	of	Overall	Research	Design	
4.2.1 Measuring	Investor	Sentiment	
Investor sentiment is measured using the yearly market-based investment sentiment index
constructed by Baker and Wurgler (2006), with adjustments made following the contributions
of Dalika and Seetharam (2015), leading to the use of the following index of investor sentiment:
ܵܧܰܶܫܯܧܰܶ = 0.623	ܰܫܱܲ + 0.451ܴܫܱܲ + 0.482	ܲݎ݁݉݅ݑ݉ + 0.420ܷܴܶܰ																	(1)
Where annual investor sentiment (SENTIMENT)  is  compiled  using  four  measures:  (1)  The
number of IPOs issued during the year (NIPO); (2) the  average first-day returns of IPOs issued
during the year (RIPO); (3) The volatility premium (Premium)43; and the JSE share turnover
(TURN)44.  Similar to Chou and Lin (2015), high (low) investor sentiment periods are defined
as the years that the investor sentiment index is above (below) its median during the sample
period of 1998 to 2015.
This study made use of logit regression models to test the impact of investor sentiment on SEO
probability (Hypothesis 3) using the procedure applied in DeAngelo et al. (2010) to calculate
standardised market-to-book ratios and market-adjusted share returns. The logit model for SEO
probability is specified as:
ܵܧ ௜ܱ௧ = ߙ + ߚଵܵܧܰ ௧ܶ + ߚଶ ܯܤ௜௧ + ߚଷܲݎ݅݋ݎܴ ௜ܶ௧ + ߚସܨݑݐݑݎܴ݁ ௜ܶ௧ + ߚହܣ݃ ௜݁௧ + ߝ௜௧ 				(2)
Where SEOit is a dummy variable (which is equal to 1 if firm i conducts a SEO in year t, and
zero if not); SENTt is the yearly sentiment index in year t; M/Bit  is the standardised market-to-
43 Measured as the year end log ratio of the value weighted average market-to-book ratio of high volatility shares
divided by that of low volatility stocks, where the top (bottom) three volatility deciles represent the high (low)
volatility shares (Dalika & Seetharam, 2015).
44 Measured as the log of total market turnover (the total rand volume of shares traded over the year) divided by
the total market capitalisation of the JSE at the end of the previous year (Dalika & Seetharam, 2015).
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book ratio for firm i in year t45; PriorRTit  is the market-adjusted share return for firm i over the
12 or 36 months ending immediately before the year t46; FutureRTit  is the market-adjusted
return for firm i over the 12 or 36 months starting immediately after the year t46; and Ageit  is
the number of years that the firm i has been listed on the JSE in year t. Ceteris paribus,  a
positive sign is expected for β1 implying that investor sentiment positively influences a firm’s
SEO decision. ɛit is  the  error  term.  The  regression  analysis  is  limited  to  firms  with  all  the
available relevant information.
Finally, a correlation matrix, condition indexes, as well as the Durbin-Watson statistic, are
generated to test for correlation and multi-collinearity between the investor sentiment index
and the other dependent variables used in the regression models. These tests are also conducted
to test  for the correlation between the dependent variables of the regression models and the
individual variables that form the investor sentiment index.
4.2.2 Announcement	Effects	
4.2.2.1 Event	Study	Analysis		
Firstly, an event study is undertaken in order to determine the market’s short-run reaction to
the SEO announcement (Hypothesis 1), using the market-adjusted returns model47 (assuming
a β of  one and α of  zero) to estimate abnormal performance (Brown & Warner,  1985).  The
market-adjusted abnormal returns are calculated as follows:
ܽݎ௜௧ = ݎ௜௧ − ݎ௜௘ 																																																																																																																																								(3)
Where
arit =abnormal return on share i on day t (where day t is the issuing day)48,
rit=return on share i on day t,
45 Calculated as the raw market-to-book ratio at the end of the previous year divided by the median market-to-
book ratio for all firms listed on the JSE at the end of the previous year.
46 The regression models are analysed first using the returns over a 12-month period, and then repeated using the
returns over a 36-month period.
47 Despite the simplicity of this model, more complicated models have not necessarily proven more robust (Jones,
Danbolt & Hirst, 2004).
48 Henceforth, the two-day abnormal cumulative share return following the announcement is also examined.
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rie =return on the JSE All Share Index on day t. Alternatively, this study uses: (1) the share’s
10 day average return (prior to the announcement date); and (2) its pre-issue 10 day maximum
return.
Then, two separate portfolios are formed for SEOs issuing during high-sentiment periods and
those issuing during low-sentiment periods. The equally-weighted average abnormal returns of
a portfolio of n shares on day t (where day t =0 is the issuing day) is calculated as follows:
ܣܴ௧ = ଵ௡∑ ܽݎ௜௧																																																																																																																																			(4)௡௜ୀଵ
Finally, the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is calculated from day k to day m (the
summation of the average abnormal returns within each portfolio):
ܥܣܴ(௞,௠) = ∑ ܣܴ௧௡௧ୀ௠ 																																																																																																																										 (5)
The CARs of  the  high-sentiment  portfolio  and  the  low-sentiment  portfolio  are  compared  in
order to test Hypothesis 4. Ceteris paribus, the high-sentiment portfolio is expected to have a
significantly less negative CAR.
4.2.2.2 Regression	Analysis		
Subsequently, OLS regression analysis is undertaken in order to investigate the impact of both
the firm characteristics and the announcement details, on the share’s short-run performance
following the SEO announcement:
ܽݎ௜௧ = ߙ + ߚଵܻ݁ܽݎݏܮ௜ ,௧ + ߚଶܳݎܽݐ݅݋௜,ଵି௧ + ߚଷܫݏݏݑ݁ܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௧ + ߚସݏ݅ݖ݁௜,௧ + ߝ௜ ,௧ 																						(6)			
Where ari,t is the abnormal return on share i at time t; YearsLi,t is the number of years that firm
i has been listed at time t; Qratioi,1-t  is a dummy variable (which is equal to 1 if firm i’s Tobin’s
Q-ratio, the year prior to announcing the SEO, exceeds 1, and zero if not); IssueSizeit  represents
the size of the issue relative to the size of firm i  at time t; and Sizeit  is the size of firm i at time
t. ɛit is the error term.
Furthermore, a correlation matrix, condition indexes, as well as the Durbin-Watson statistic,
are generated to test for correlation and multi-collinearity between the explanatory variables.
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4.2.3 Long-run	Effects	(Long-run	Performance)	
Firstly, the performance of SEO firms are compared to that of non-issuing matching firms in
order to examine whether issuing firms underperform on the JSE (Hypothesis 2). Secondly, the
effect of investor sentiment on long-run performance is examined (Hypothesis 5).
4.2.3.1 Matching	Procedure	
In line with previous literature, the matching procedure is based on both size and the market-
to-book ratio and closely resembles the methodology undertaken in Ritter (2003). A size-match
is attained by matching the issuing firm to a non-issuing firm that is closest in size.
Alternatively, a style-match is attained by matching an issuing firm to a non-issuing firm that
is in the same size decile and that has the closest market-to-book ratio. These matching firms
are included for the entire five-year holding period unless they are delisted or issue equity, in
which case a new match is drawn from the initial candidates described above. If a firm issues
equity more than once during a five-year period, only its first equity issue is considered49. A
non-issuing firms is defined as a firm that has not issued equity in the last five years.
4.2.3.2 Benchmark	Selection	and	Comparing	the	Market-based	Performance	
Firstly, the performance of issuing and non-issuing firms is measured by using the simple
holding-period returns approach. The equally-weighted buy-and-hold returns (BHRs) are
calculated as follows:
ܤܪܴ = 	 ଵ
ே
∑ ൣ∏ (1 + ܴ௜௧) − 1்೔௧ୀఛ೔ ൧ × 100																																																																																				(7)ே௜ୀଵ
Where N is the number of shares in a portfolio, Rit is the return of share i over month t, and Ti
is the effective holding period for share i (which is measured in 1-year, 3-year, and 5-year
holding periods, or until the SEO is delisted). For robustness, a value-weighted approach is
also examined for all measures of long-run share performance.
49 The results of this study are robust to the exclusion of firms making multiple announcements within a five year
period.
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The comparative share performance is  then calculated as the difference in BHRs for issuers
and their matching firms. This seems to be the most popular method of comparing performance
of issuing and non-issuing firms. However, for robustness the calculation and comparison of
the equally-weighted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) of issuing and non-issuing
firms are also examined:
ܤܪܣܴ = 	 ଵ
ே
∑ ൣ൫∏ (1 + ܴ௜௧)்೔௧ୀఛ೔ ൯ − ൫∏ (1 + ܴ௠௧்೔௧ୀఛ೔ ൯൧																																																													(8)ே௜ୀଵ
Where Rmt is the market return over month t50, or alternatively, it is the expected return for
share i in month t (Erit) as calculated using the CAPM:
ܧݎ௜௧ = ܴ ௧݂ + 	ߚ௜ 	(ܴ௠௧ − ܴ ௧݂)																																																																																																													(9)
Where Rft, represents  the  returns  for  the  risk  free  asset  in  month t51, and βi represents the
sensitivity of share i relative to the market (commonly referred to as systematic risk).
Finally, to test whether investor sentiment has an effect on the performance of SEO firms
(Hypothesis 5), the BHRs and BHARs of the high-sentiment portfolio are compared with that
of the low-sentiment portfolio.
4.2.3.3 Comparing	Operating	Performance		
The operating performance of issuing- and non-issuing firms are compared over a period of
five years using a Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks test in order test for differences in
distributions. For studies investigating operating performance, it is common to report the
median values of accounting ratios, given the skewness of these accounting ratios (DeAngelo,
1988).
Thus, operating performance is measured as the median year on year percentage change using
the following popular measures of operating performance: (1) return on assets (ROA); (2)
50 The JSE All Share Total Returns index (J203T) is used to proxy the returns of the market portfolio.
51 The 3-month South African Treasury bill is used as the proxy for the risk-free rate.
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earnings per share (EPS); and (3) return on equity (ROE)52. Operating performance is tested
across, one-, three-, and five-year periods.
4.2.4 Robustness	Checks	for	Long-run	Share	Performance		
For  robustness,  the  examination  of  the  long-run  share  performance  following  SEOs  is  also
examined using the calendar-time portfolio approach (Fama, 1998; Mitchell & Stafford 2000).
This approach is  be applied for:  (1) comparing the long-run abnormal share performance of
issuing firms and non-issuing firms; and (2) comparing the performance of issuing firms that
conducted their SEOs during periods of high-investor sentiment vis-à-vis the firms conducting
SEOs during periods of low-investor sentiment.
4.2.4.1 Measuring	Long-run	Abnormal	Share	Performance	
Every month the issuing and non-issuing portfolios are reformed, taking into consideration all
the firms that have conducted SEOs in the last 3, 4 or 5 years and their non-matching
counterparts. Every month, firms that have issued new shares in the last 3, 4, or 5 years are
added to the issuing portfolio, while firms that have not conducted SEOs in those timeframes
are excluded53. Likewise, non-issuing firms are added (or dropped) from the non-issuing
portfolio on a monthly basis subject to the inclusion (or exclusion) of their issuing counterparts
from the issuing portfolio. A zero-investment portfolio is then also formed, which is equivalent
to buying the issuing portfolio and shorting (or selling) the non-issuing portfolio. The abnormal
returns of these portfolios, as specified by the application of the CAPM, are the intercepts of
the following regressions:
ܧݔܴܿ݁ݐ௣,௧ = ܽ + ܾൣܴ௠௧ − ܴ௙௧൧ + ௧݁ 																																																																																													(10)		
Where
· ExcRetSEO,t = RSEO,t – Rft
· ExcRetMatch,t = RMatch,t – Rft
· ExcRetSEO-Match,t = RSEO,t – RMatch,t
52 EPS is calculated as the profits attributed to ordinary shareholders divided by the number of ordinary shares
outstanding. ROA is calculated as the earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA)
divided by total assets. ROE is calculated as EBITDA divided by the total book value of equity.
53 Henceforth, these three time periods are also referred to as issuing window periods.
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Furthermore, RSEO,t, and RMatch,t represent the monthly returns on the issuing portfolio and the
non-issuing portfolio at time t, respectively54. Rmt is the market return in month t, and Rft is the
risk free rate in month t. A reminder that the intercept, a, measures abnormal performance and
is comparable to measuring Jensen’s alpha (Brav, Geczy & Gompers, 2000). et  is  the error
term. For additional robustness, the portfolio returns are evaluated using both an equally-
weighted and a value-weighted approach.
4.2.4.2 Evaluating	 the	 Influence	 of	 Investor	 Sentiment	 on	 Long-run	 Share	
Performance		
Every month, the low-sentiment and the high-sentiment portfolios are reformed, taking into
account all the firms that have conducted SEOs in the last 3, 4, or 5 years.  Every month, firms
that have performed SEOs in the last 3, 4, or 5 years are added to the relevant portfolio with
respect to investor sentiment at the time of issuing, while firms that have not conducted SEOs
in those timeframes are dropped.  The zero-investment portfolio is then formed using the
CAPM to estimate the abnormal returns of this portfolio55:
ܴ௣௧ = ܴு௧ − ܴ௅௧ = ܽ + ܾൣܴ௠௧ − ௙ܴ௧൧ + ݁௧ 																																																																																		(11)
Where Rpt is the return of the zero-investment portfolio in month t, RHt is the return of the high-
sentiment portfolio in month t, RLt is return on the low-sentiment portfolio in month t, Rmt is
the market return in month t, and Rft is the risk free rate in month t. The intercept, a, measures
the effect of sentiment on the long-run share performance after SEOs. Ceteris paribus,  a
negative intercept is expected, indicating that firms conducting SEOs during high-sentiment
periods experience more severe long-run underperformance in comparison to firms conducting
SEOs during low-sentiment periods.  For added robustness, the portfolio returns are evaluated
using both an equally-weighted and a value-weighted approach.
	
54 Separate,  non-issuing  portfolios  are  formed  for  firms  matched  using  both  the  size-matching  and  the  style-
matching approach.
55 In this case, the zero-investment portfolio is equivalent to going long in the high-sentiment portfolio and
shorting the low-sentiment portfolio.
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4.3 Limitations	
The main limitation of this study, when compared to the international body of research, is the
restricted sample size. There are significantly less companies that are listed on the JSE, when
compared to the major US stock exchanges. Therefore, it is a natural progression that
comparatively, there are less SEO announcements used in this study. This relatively small
sample size prevented attempts to further categorise announcements based on the stated use of
funds and the announcing firm’s industry. Furthermore, the robustness of many statistical tests
may be weakened as sample size decreases. Despite this limitation, the sample size used in this
study is similar to the sample sizes used in other South African studies of IPOs, and is large
enough to produce credible results with multiple robustness measures put into place to improve
the reliability of the findings.
Nonetheless, these limitations leave room for improvement and highlight potential avenues for
future research. Categorising announcements based on the intended use of funds could provide
important insight to the performance of SEOs and the market’s initial reaction to the SEO
announcement. In future, more attention should also be focused towards examining the post-
issue risk patterns of SEO firms in light of the literature documenting the reduced risk of SEO
firms following issuance. For instance, Lyandres, Sun and Zhang (2005) find that issuing-firms
tend to have lower liquidity betas, and Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino (2006) show that using
a dynamic beta approach led to SEO underperformance disappearing. Due to the extensive
nature of the comprehensive tests undertaken in this study these avenues of research were not
pursued, leaving room for future exploration. Understanding the post-SEO risk patterns in the
South African context would greatly assist managers in their capital structure decision process.
4.4 Summary	of	the	Methodology		
This chapter aims to outline the methodology undertaken in this study, whilst also making note
of the important limitations encountered during the analysis conducted. Firstly, an event study,
as well as regression analysis are undertaken in order to analyse the market’s initial reaction to
the announcements of SEOs. Secondly, the long-run financial and operating performance of
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SEOs are analysed, with an important emphasis placed on analysing the influence of investor
sentiment on the long-run performance of SEOs. Finally, factor regression analysis is
undertaken as a robustness measure to the analysis on the long-run financial performance of
SEOs. The main limitations to the empirical framework of this study are attributed to the
restricted sample size and the general shortage of information conveyed in the SEO
announcements.
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5 Results		
The results are divided into four main sections. The first section examines the market’s reaction
to SEO announcements, in addition to exploring the potential influences on the market’s
reaction to these announcements. The second section explores the influence of investor
sentiment, and other explanatory variables, on the probability of a firm conducting a SEO. The
third section explores the differences in the long-run returns of issuing firms vis-à-vis non-
issuing firms, as well as the impact of investor sentiment on these long-run returns. Finally, the
fourth section, examines the differences in the long-run operating performances between
issuing firms and non-issuing firms, and the impact of investor sentiment on the operating
performance of issuing firms.
5.1 Investor	Sentiment	and	the	Probability	of	SEOs	
5.1.1 The	Summary	Statistics		
Figure 1 shows the annual investor sentiment plotted against the median investor sentiment
from 1998 to 2015, with points above (below) the median indicating periods of high (low)
investor sentiment56. An interesting, expected pattern emerges with investor sentiment peaking
prior to the 2008 global financial crisis, followed by a sharp descent illustrating the spill-over
effect of the US housing crisis. This is followed by a gradual ‘recovery’ of investor sentiment
in South Africa. This is a clear illustration that investor sentiment is not only driven by
conditions in the domestic economy, but by international events. While anomalous events may
cause  exaggerated  spikes  and  declines  in  investor  sentiment  that  has  the  potential  to  skew
results, an aim of this study is to examine the impact of investor sentiment on the performance
of SEO firms. Therefore, by controlling for investor sentiment, the results of this study provide
an added layer of reliability.
56 A similar approach to defining periods of high- and low-investor sentiment was undertaken by DeAngelo et al.
(2010), and Chou and Lin (2015). Median values are commonly used due to the skewness of the annual investor
sentiment index data.
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Figure 1: The investor sentiment index
The summary statistics for investor sentiment, prior market-adjusted share returns, future
market-adjusted share returns, standardised market-to-book ratios, and the years listed are
presented in Table 1. The mean and median of the investor sentiment index are both relatively
close to one, indicating that investor sentiment is slightly tending toward higher levels during
the sample period. All else considered, a mean and median of zero, would have indicated that
investor sentiment would not be inclining toward either high or low levels over the sample
period. This illustrates the derived benefit of defining high- and low-investor sentiment periods
as relative to the sample period, as opposed to assuming that the average investor sentiment
levels are zero.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variables Mean Median Std.Dev Skewness Kurtosis #Obs.
Sentiment
index 1.084 0.857 1.089 1.435 2.844 18
Years listed 21.491 14.000 19.86 1.367 1.029 2835
Standardised
M/B ratio 2.561 1.000 42.828 45.912 2339.36 2835
PriorRT12
(%)* 1.325 1.179 1.450 20.432 607.787 2835
PriorRT36
(%)* 2.132 1.431 3.075 7.380 79.694 2835
FutureRT12
(%)* 1.338 1.174 1.415 20.826 651.458 2835
FutureRT36
(%)* 2.140 1.522 2.965 7.939 90.834 2835
*Note: That all prior, and future share returns are calculated using the cumulative monthly returns of the entire
window period.
The average  age  of  the  sample  firms  included  in  the  logit  regression  is  approximately  21.5
years, whilst future and past returns are fairly symmetric, indicating that any possible long-run
SEO underperformance would not be attributed to market conditions. The extreme skewness
and kurtosis of the variables used in the regression analysis fall in line with the relevant existing
literature (Chou & Lin, 2015).
5.1.2 Regression	Analysis		 	
Table 2, which shows the correlation between the explanatory variables used in the regression
analysis, reveals no worrying patterns of high correlation between these variables57. The
strongest correlations are between the prior 12- and 36-month abnormal returns, as well as the
future 12- and 36-month abnormal returns, which is entirely expected as these variables overlap
for the initial 12 months. All other variables display relatively low levels of correlation.
57 These results are confirmed in separate analysis of the condition indexes in addition to conducting the Durbin-
Watson test. Furthermore, the four individual variables that are used to construct the investor sentiment index,
also display relatively low correlation with the other explanatory variables of the logit regression models as shown
in Section 1 of the Appendix.
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Table 2: Correlation matrix for the logit regression models
I.Sent Age Prior12 Prior36 future12 future36 Std. M/B
I.Sent 1.000
Age 0.019 1.000
Prior12 -0.005 -0.036 1.000
Prior36 0.162 -0.039 0.433 1.000
future12 -0.091 -0.034 -0.013 -0.040 1.000
future36 -0.077 -0.082 -0.011 -0.055 0.479 1.000
Std. M/B 0.022 -0.027 0.044 0.087 0.079 -0.010 1.000
Table 3: Regression analysis on the decision to conduct SEOs
Intercept Investor
sentiment
M/B ratio Prior
share
return
Future
share
return
Years
listed
Regression A: All firms with 12-month prior and future returns
Coefficient -2.023*** -0.009 -0.289 -1.477***
Regression B: All firms with 36-month prior and future returns
Coefficient -2.846*** -0.002 -0,021 -0.765***
Regression C: All firms with years listed included (with 12-month prior and future
returns)
Coefficient -1.805*** -0.008 -0.268 -1.377*** -0.019**
Regression D: All firms with years listed included (with 36-month prior and future
returns)
Coefficient -2.499*** -0.002 -0.023 -0.724*** -0.021**
Regression E: All firms with investor sentiment included (with 12-month prior and
future returns)
Coefficient -1.411*** 0.048 -0.004 -0.117 -0.533***
Regression F: All firms with investor sentiment included (with 36-month prior and
future returns)
Coefficient -1.752*** 0.071 -0.001 -0.017 -0.259***
Regression G: All firms with investor sentiment and years listed included (with 12-
month prior and future returns)
Coefficient -2.007*** 0.121 -0.009 -0.286 -1.293*** -0.020**
Regression H: All firms with investor sentiment and years listed included (with 36-
month prior and future returns)
Coefficient -1.607*** 0.076 -0.001 -0.018 -0.249*** -0.009**
Note:  ***,  **,  and  *,  denote  that  the  variable  is  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  1%,  5%,  and  10%
significance level, respectively.
Table 3 reports the regression analysis surrounding the decision to conduct SEOs. Similar to
the findings of Chou and Lin (2015), the probability of a firm conducting a SEO is significantly
negatively related to the number of years listed and the future share return. This falls in line
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with the international evidence suggesting that firms conducting SEOs underperform with
regards to future share returns (Loughran & Ritter, 1995). Moreover, the implication of
younger firms being more likely to conduct SEOs fits the narrative of the market timing
theories, which suggest that the shares of younger firms are more susceptible to misvaluations,
ultimately increasing the incentive to issue shares.
Contradictory to the popular market timing explanation, regressions A to H indicate that there
does not seem to be any significant relationship between either a firm’s market-to-book ratio,
or a firm’s prior abnormal share return, and the probability that a firm conducts a SEO. In fact,
there appears to be a negative, albeit non-significant relationship between these variables.
Therefore, there does not appear to be any signs that the firms conducting SEOs are attempting
to take advantage of high market valuations or previously high abnormal returns.
As shown in the results of regressions E to I, investor sentiment has a positive, but insignificant
influence on the probability of a firm conducting a SEO. Although there are more SEOs during
high-investor sentiment periods compared to low-investor sentiment periods (as shown in
Table 8 further below), investor sentiment does not appear to be significantly influencing
management’s decision to issue new shares.
One imperative consideration to make when analysing the results in this section, is the
significantly smaller proportion of firms conducting SEOs in South Africa, relative to both the
total general populous of listed firms in South Africa, and the number of firms conducting
SEOs  in  the  US.   To  put  this  into  context,  the  sample  in  this  study  includes  152  SEO
announcements compared to the 2,835 total firm-year observations included in the logit
regressions.  Thus,  the  small  sample  size  would  naturally  present  a  challenge  to  finding  any
significant results in the logit regression analysis. This point is further illustrated by the
unreported, low R-squared values across all eight regression models, indicating the
inadequacies of the explanatory variables in explaining a firm’s decision on whether or not to
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conduct a SEO58. Therefore, the decision to issue equity is poorly explained by the explanatory
variables used in all 8 regression models.
In summary, although it would make sense that more corporate activity takes place during
periods of high-investor sentiment, there is no significant evidence that firms conducting SEOs
are attempting to time the market. This contradicts the market timing theory and the findings
of previous international literature that analyse the relationship between investor sentiment and
SEOs (DeAngelo et al., 2010; Chou & Lin, 2015). These results were hindered by restrictions
in the sample size.
5.2 The	Stock	Market’s	Reaction	to	SEO	Announcements		
5.2.1 Event	Study	Analysis		
The sample covers 152 SEO announcements made by 79 firms, with 81 announcements
occurring during periods of high-investor sentiment in contrast to the 71 announcements
occurring during periods of low-investor sentiment (as reported in Table 8 further below).
Further analysis of the sample and its observable patterns are discussed in subsequent sections,
with this section focusing on the market’s reaction to the SEO announcements.
58 R-squared values range from 4 to 6 %, indicating an extremely poor explanatory model.
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Table 4: The stock market's reaction to SEO announcements
Mean Median #Obs. Std.Dev Neg. /Pos.
1-day raw
return -0.027*** -0.017*** 152 0.042 108/13
2-day
cumulative
raw return
-0.026*** -0.009*** 152 0.090 86/41
1-day
abnormal
return
-0.027*** -0.015*** 152 0.041 130/22
2-day
cumulative
abnormal
return
-0.026*** -0.012*** 152 0.090 101/51
Note:  ***,  **,  and  *,  denote  that  the  variable  is  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  1%,  5%,  and  10%
significance level, respectively.
Table 4 reports the results of the share price movements in response to the SEO announcements.
The average actual return and abnormal return on the day of the SEO announcement are both
-2.7%. Moreover, in line qualitatively and quantitatively with the findings of Ritter (2003), the
average two-day cumulative abnormal return following a SEO announcement is -2.6%. The
market reacts in a similarly negative fashion when measuring the one-day abnormal share
returns  as  well  as  the  actual  cumulative  two-day  share  returns  following  the  SEO
announcement.  Across  the  four  measures  used,  it  is  clear  that  the  majority  of  SEO
announcements are met with a negative response from the market as illustrated by the last
column in Table 4.
In further support of these findings, the median values are also significantly negative across
the board. Overall, these findings are in line with the adverse selection model developed by
Myers and Majluf (1984) predicting a negative share price reaction to SEO announcements,
adding to the vast amount of confirmatory international evidence. These findings are robust to
the different measures of abnormal returns used in this study59.
59 As shown in Section 2 of the Appendix.
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5.2.2 Industry	Analysis		
An industry break-down of the announcements, as illustrated in Figure 2, reveals that 43 out of
the 79 firms (54.43%) included in the sample fall under the basic materials sector. Mining firms
have come under severe pressure in more recent years due to falling commodity prices and
other significant events, such as the heavy protests in South Africa led by trade unions. These
considerations could influence the results of this study, considering that investors could
potentially react even more negatively to SEO announcements made by firms belonging to the
basic material sector given the poor recent performance of the mining industry in general.
Figure 2: Industry representation of the firms in the sample
Table 5 compares the stock market’s reaction to SEO announcements made by firms belonging
to the basic materials sector, to that of firms belonging to other sectors. The analysis illustrates
the virtually identical market reaction to announcements made by firms belonging to either
category. Despite the market reacting slightly more negatively to basic material SEO firms, as
measured by the two-day abnormal cumulative returns, there are no significant differences in
the market’s reaction to SEO announcements made by these two distinct categories of firms
across the board (as illustrated in column 6).
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Table 5: Comparative industry performance
Basic
Materials  (1)
# Obs. Other Sectors
(2)
#Obs. Difference
(1)-(2)
1-day raw
return -0.026*** 96 -0.028*** 56 0.002
2-day
cumulative
raw return
-0.027*** 96 -0.024*** 56 -0.003
1-day
abnormal
return
-0.027*** 96 -0.027*** 56 0.000
2-day
cumulative
abnormal
return
-0.028*** 96 -0.022*** 56 -0.006
Note:  ***,  **,  and  *,  denote  that  the  variable  is  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  1%,  5%,  and  10%
significance level, respectively.
Due to the restricted sample size, a further industry breakdown would not yield any reliable
results. However, this simple industry breakdown into two categories makes an important
contribution to the overall results of the earlier event study analysis, by demonstrating that the
results are not skewed by the substantial presence of the basic materials sector. The market
generally seems to react negatively to SEO announcements in virtually equal magnitudes,
whether a firm belongs to the basic materials sector or not.
This  result  is  not  completely  unexpected,  considering  that  the  sample  period  covers  a  wide
range of years where mining firms did not always necessarily perform poorly. In fact, the
declining performance of the mining sector is more a recent trend, with the sector performing
extremely well in certain preceding periods.
5.2.3 Regression	Analysis		
This section attempts to better understand and explain the market’s generally negative reaction
to SEOs. The correlation matrix, shown in Table 6, reports no worrying patterns of high
correlation between the explanatory variables included in the regression analysis. This is
confirmed by separate analysis of the Durbin-Watson test and the condition indexes.
66
Table 6: Correlation matrix for the event study regression models
Size of firm Years listed Issue size
relative to firm
size
Tobin's Q
Size of firm 1.000
Years listed 0.060 1.000
Issue relative
to size -0.030 -0.037 1.000
Tobin's Q -0.049 -0.176 0.016 1.000
Table 7 reveals the results of the regression analysis. Across the four regressions, there is no
confirmatory evidence that markets react more negatively to SEO announcements conducted
by younger firms (firms that have been listed for less years on the JSE). Similarly, the market’s
reaction  does  not  seem  to  be  significantly  influenced  by  either  the  size  of  a  firm  or  by  the
relative issue size, with all the above mentioned coefficients insignificant and approximately
equal to zero. As expected, there is a slightly positive relationship between the market’s
reaction  to  the  SEO announcements  and  the  Tobin’s  Q-ratio  of  the  issuing  firm (which  is  a
proxy for the perceived quality of a firm’s investment opportunities). However, the coefficient
is also insignificant across all four regression models.
Table 7: Event study regression analysis
Intercept Years
listed
Q-ratio Issue size Size R2
Regression 1: 1 day actual return
Coefficient -0.031*** 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.010
Regression 2: 2 day actual cumulative return
Coefficient -0.025 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.022
Regression 3: 1 day abnormal return
Coefficient -0.032*** 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.037
Regression 4: 2 day abnormal cumulative return
Coefficient -0.026 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.060
Note:  ***,  **,  and  *,  denote  that  the  variable  is  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  1%,  5%,  and  10%
significance level, respectively.
The failure of the four regression models to find any significant relationships between the
market’s reaction to the SEO announcements and the popular explanatory variables set-out by
previous literature, is further highlighted by the extremely low R-squared values across the
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regression  models.  These  findings  are  in  line  with  the  results  of  Barclay  and  Litzenberger
(1988), who also reported that neither the issue size nor the expected profitability of a firm’s
planned investments (also measured using Tobin’s Q-ratio) had any significant influence on
SEO announcement effects.
Overall, the results indicate that none of the proposed explanatory variables display any
significant influences on the market’s reaction to SEO announcements. In fact, these variables
perform poorly in attempting to explain the market’s reaction. The relative issue size, age of
the firm, size of the firm, and the firm’s Tobin’s Q-ratio do not significantly impact the market’s
reaction to the SEO announcement. None of these variables appear to either mitigate or
exacerbate the market’s generally negative perception of SEO announcements60.
5.2.4 Investor	Sentiment	and	SEO	Announcements		
Figure 3: SEO announcements across the sample period
60 These results are robust to a backward-elimination stepwise regression approach, where the most insignificant
variables are removed from the regression models before repeating the analysis.
5
4
3
4
9
6
3
5
6
20
13
17
11
13
5
6
10
12
0
5
10
15
20
25
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Nu
m
be
ro
fS
EO
an
no
un
ce
m
en
ts
Year
68
As illustrated in Figure 3, the annual amount of SEO announcements issued peaked in 2007
and remained relatively high for the following few years.  Despite the obvious peak in 2007
and a few other high (low) issue periods which coincide with high (low) investor sentiment
periods, there seems to be a reasonably stable flow of announcements across the years,
irrespective of investor sentiment. No clear-cut pattern emerges to reliably signal that the peaks
and troughs in issuing activity are undeniably influenced by investor sentiment. For example,
the second highest period of SEO announcements occurred in 2009, a period corresponding to
low-investor sentiment. Figure 3 is a near perfect illustration confirming the earlier results
found in Section 5.1.2 which failed to establish a significant relationship between investor
sentiment and the probability of a firm conducting a SEO. Nevertheless, there are more SEO
announcements during periods of high-investor sentiment (81) relative to the announcements
made during periods of low-investor sentiment (71), as seen in Table 8 below.
Table 8: Investor sentiment and the stock market's reaction to SEO announcements
SEOs during
high-
sentiment
periods (1)
# Obs. SEOs during
low-
sentiment
periods (2)
#Obs. Difference
(1)-(2)
1-day raw
return -0.027*** 81 -0.026*** 71 -0.001
2-day
cumulative
raw return
-0.022*** 81 -0.030*** 71 0.008
1-day
abnormal
return
-0.026*** 81 -0.027*** 71 0.001
2-day
cumulative
abnormal
return
-0.021*** 81 -0.031*** 71 0.010
Note:  ***,  **,  and  *,  denote  that  the  variable  is  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  1%,  5%,  and  10%
significance level, respectively.
Table 8 reports the difference in share price movements for firms issuing during different
periods of investor sentiment. Ceteris paribus, it is expected that the stock market would react
less negatively to SEO announcements during periods of high-investor sentiment (Hypothesis
4). However, the results find no significant differences between the share price movements of
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firms conducting SEOs during periods of low-investor sentiment vis-à-vis firms conducting
SEOs during periods of high-investor sentiment.
Although firms conducting SEOs during high-sentiment periods do, on average, experience a
less negative two-day abnormal cumulative return of approximately 1% when compared to
their low-sentiment period counterparts, this difference is insignificant. These results are
confirmed when analysing the alternative measures of abnormal share price returns, with no
indication of any significant differences across the board.  The market does appear to react
slightly less negatively to SEO announcements made during periods of high-investor sentiment
in terms of magnitude (with exception of the one-day actual raw returns). However, none of
these differences are significant.
In summary, investor sentiment does not appear to significantly influence the short-run
performance of firms conducting SEOs. Contradictory to predictions set forth by the market
timing  theory,  the  market  does  not  appear  to  react  significantly  less  negatively  to  the  SEO
announcements made during periods of high-investor sentiment. These results fail to establish
the added incentive of issuing SEOs during periods of high-investor sentiment, as documented
in the previous international literature (Chou & Lin, 2015).
5.3 Long-run	Share	Performance	
5.3.1 Long-run	Returns	
The ‘new issues puzzle’ describes the debatable, arguably inexplicable long-run
underperformance of issuing firms when compared to non-issuing firms: A puzzle that has
attracted world-wide attention, but has been largely ignored in the South African context - until
now.
5.3.1.1 Buy-and-Hold	Returns		
Tables 9 and 10 report and compare the long-run buy-and-hold returns of issuing firms and
non-issuing firms (based on both size- and style-matching procedures) across one, three, and
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five year intervals, using an equally-weighted and value-weighted approach, respectively. The
sample size is notably reduced from the initial 79 issuing firms included in the event study and
varies across the different share price performance measures and time horizons due to three
reasons. Firstly, a proportion of issuing firms delisted during the course of the five-year period
after conducting the SEO61. Secondly, the timing of the announcement restricts certain firms
from being included in the long-run analysis. For example, firms conducting SEOs during 2015
are included in the event study analysis, but were naturally excluded from the long-run
performance analysis. Thirdly, in search of the upmost credibility in results, outliers are
removed from the sample62.
Table 9: Equally-weighted long-run buy-and-hold returns
Issuing
firms (1)
#Obs. Non-issuing
firms (2)
#Obs. Difference
(1)-(2)
Panel A: Size-match
1 year -0,124 61 0.065 61 -0.189**
3 years -0,098 52 0.586 52 -0.684***
5 years -0,318 39 1.377 39 -1.695***
Panel B: Style-match
1 year -0.124 61 0.057 61 -0.181**
3 years -0.098 52 0.457 52 -0.555***
5 years -0,318 39 0.802 39 -1.120***
Note:  ***,  **,  and  *,  denote  that  the  variable  is  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  1%,  5%,  and  10%
significance level, respectively.
Firstly, the equally-weighted buy-and-hold returns, as shown in Table 9, are discussed. Panel
A of Table 9 reports the results of issuing firms relative to their non-issuing counterparts
matched on the basis of size (size-matches). On average, an investor would lose 12.4% after
one year of investing in the shares of an issuing firm, compared to making a positive return of
6.5% by investing in the shares of a non-issuing firm instead (representing a significant 18.9%
difference in absolute terms) . The significant underperformance of issuing firms becomes
more pronounced as the time-horizon is increased, with a staggering 169.5% difference in
average buy-and-hold returns over a five-year period.
61 Delisted firms were included in the sample in order to avoid survivorship bias. However, their performance was
only measured prior to the delisting.
62 The main findings of this study are robust to the inclusion of the outliers as shown in Sections 3 and 4 of the
Appendix.
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Panel B of Table 9, reports the results of issuing firms relative to non-issuing firms matched
on the basis of both size and market-to-book ratios (style-matches). There is still significant
underperformance of issuing firms relative to non-issuing firms that intensifies across broader
time horizons. However, in line with the findings of Ritter (2003), applying this more
comprehensive matching procedure slightly reduces the magnitude of the underperformance.
Thus,  it  can  be  implied  that  matching  firms  on  the  basis  of  size  and  market-to-book  ratios,
rather than just size, helps to a certain extent in explaining the differences in returns.
For example, the average one year buy-and-hold return remains -12.4% for issuing firms
compared to the average one year buy-and-hold return of 5.7% for the non-issuing, style
matched firms (revealing a slightly less, but still significant, difference of 18.1% in absolute
terms). The differences in the average buy-and-hold returns over three-, and five-year periods
between issuing and non-issuing firms are also reduced in comparison to the findings in Panel
A, but remain substantial and significant.
Table 10: Value-weighted long-run buy-and-hold returns
Issuing
firms
#Obs. Non-issuing
firms
#Obs. Difference
(1)-(2)
Panel A: Size-match
1 year -0.984 53 -0.979 53 -0.005
3 years -0.988 45 -0.976 45 -0.012
5 years -0.974 35 -0.940 35 -0.034
Panel B: Style-match
1 year -0.984 53 -0.985 53 0.001
3 years -0.988 45 -0.983 45 -0.005
5 years -0.974 35 -0.928 35 -0.046
Note:  ***,  **,  and  *,  denote  that  the  variable  is  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  1%,  5%,  and  10%
significance level, respectively.
The value-weighted buy-and-hold return analysis, shown in Panels A and B of Table 10,
provides no significant evidence of the underperformance of issuing firms, when compared to
either their size-, or style-matched counterparts. Across all three time horizons, there is no
significant differences between the performance of issuing firms and their non-issuing
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counterparts. Although issuing firms did typically experience slightly lower returns than non-
issuing firms as illustrated by the generally negative differences reported in the last column63,
none of these differences are significant. Furthermore, the relative underperformance of issuing
firms is  vastly reduced in magnitude when compared to the results  reported in Table 9.  For
instance, issuing firms only underperform by 4.6% over a five-year period compared to style-
matched, non-issuing firms when using a value-weighted approach64. These findings are
consistent with the findings of Hertzil and Li (2010), who found that using a value-weighted
approach of measuring market performance, as opposed to an equally-weighed approach,
attenuated the underperformance of SEOs firms. With exception of the five-year window
period, using the style-matching procedure instead of the size-matching procedure, again helps
in  reducing  the  magnitude  of  the  difference  in  returns  between  issuing  firms  and  their  non-
issuing counterparts.
Overall, this evidence illustrates the significant long-run share underperformance of issuing
firms relative to non-issuing firms when comparing equally-weighted buy-and-hold returns,
which is consistent with the existing literature. These results are consistent across one-, three-
,  and  five-year  intervals  and  holds  for  both  the  size-,  and  the  style-matching  procedures.  In
contrast, the magnitude of underperformance is severely reduced and becomes insignificant
when using a value-weighted approach of measuring share performance. The fact that the
equally-weighted results are, on average, more significant and of a greater magnitude than the
value-weighted results, implies that the phenomenon of issuing firm underperformance is
possibly more prominent for smaller firms. Moreover, using a style match appears to typically
reduce the relative underperformance of issuing firms vis-a-vis non-issuing firms, to a certain
extent.
5.3.1.2 Buy-and-Hold	Abnormal	Market	Returns		
Tables 11 and 12 report and compare the long-run buy-and-hold abnormal market returns of
issuing firms and non-issuing firms (based on both size-, and style-matching procedures) across
one, three, and five year intervals, using an equally-weighted and a value-weighted approach,
63 With exception of the insignificant, positive difference in the one-year buy-and-hold returns of issuing firms
vis-à-vis their style-matched counterparts.
64 Again, this underperformance is not significant.
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respectively. The market returns are used as a benchmark to compare the performance of these
portfolios.
Table 11 shows the results of the equally-weighted analysis and produces similar results to the
results in Table 9 above. There is a clear indication of issuing firm underperformance across
all three different time horizons. The underperformance is robust to both matching portfolio
procedures and grows rapidly as the time horizon is broadened. With exception of the average
three-year buy-and-hold abnormal market returns, introducing the style match procedure helps
to reduce the magnitude, but not the significance, of the issuing firm underperformance.
Table 11: Equally-weighted long-run buy-and-hold abnormal market returns
Issuing
firms
#Obs. Non-issuing
firms
#Obs. Difference
(1)-(2)
Panel A: Size-match
1 year -1.163 63 -0.939 63 -0.224***
3 years -1.359 53 -0.671 53 -0.688***
5 years -1.663 40 -0.422 40 -1.241***
Panel B: Style-match
1 year -1.163 63 -0.952          63 -0.211***
3 years -1.359 53 -0.546 53 -0.813***
5 years -1.663 40 -0.616 40 -1.047***
Note:  ***,  **,  and  *,  denote  that  the  variable  is  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  1%,  5%,  and  10%
significance level, respectively.
Table 12 demonstrates the robustness of issuing firm underperformance to the use of a value-
weighted approach of measuring share performance. Across all three time horizons, issuing
firms significantly underperform when compared to either their size-, or style-matched
counterparts. Once again, these results illustrate the attenuating effect of the style-matching
procedure on SEO underperformance. Notably, the magnitude of the SEO underperformance
is massively reduced in comparison to the results of the equally-weighted approach reported in
Table 11, again implying that SEO underperformance is more prominent for smaller firms.
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Table 12: Value-weighted long-run buy-and-hold abnormal market returns
Issuing
firms
#Obs. Non-issuing
firms
#Obs. Difference
(1)-(2)
Panel A: Size-match
1 year -1.001 39 -0.999 39 -0.002***
3 years -1.002 39 -0.997 39 -0.005***
5 years -1.005 29 -0.987 29 -0.018***
Panel B: Style-match
1 year -1.001 39 -1.000 39 -0.001**
3 years -1.002 39 -0.999 39 -0.003***
5 years -1.005 29 -0.996 29 -0.009***
Note:  ***,  **,  and  *,  denote  that  the  variable  is  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  1%,  5%,  and  10%
significance level, respectively.
In  summary,  the  two  most  popular  measures  of  long-run  share  performance  in  the  SEO
literature65 both provide evidence that  issuing firms generally underperform relative to non-
issuing firms for periods of up to five years following the issue. Whilst the evidence fits the
general consensus surrounding the SEO literature, this begs the question on whether these
patterns are explained by risk. Although the sheer magnitude of SEO underperformance
reported when using an equally-weighted approach presents an interesting eccentricity in the
South African context, the value-weighted approach to measuring share performance reveals
only slight, if any, underperformance. These results imply that SEO underperformance is more
pronounced for smaller firms.
5.3.1.3 Buy-and-Hold	Abnormal	Realised	Returns		
While the previous sections appears to point towards the existence of a ‘new issues puzzle’ in
South Africa,  the underperformance of issuing firms would only qualify as a ‘puzzle’ if  the
underperformance remains unexplained. This section attempts to explain the contrasting
performance of issuing firms and non-issuing firms with the use of the Capital Asset Pricing
Model.
Tables 13 and 14 report and compare the long-run buy-and-hold abnormal realised returns of
issuing firms and non-issuing firms (based on both size-, and style-matching procedures) across
65 Namely the buy-and-hold return approach and the buy-and-hold abnormal market return approach.
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one, three, and five year intervals, using an equally-weighted and value-weighted approach,
respectively. The share’s actual returns are compared to their expected returns as implied by
the CAPM.
Table 13: Equally-weighted long-run buy-and-hold abnormal realised returns
Issuing
firms
#Obs. Non-issuing
firms
#Obs. Difference
(1)-(2)
Panel A: Size-match
1 year -0.168 59 -0.196 59 0.028
3 years -0.585 40 -0.477 40      -0.108
5 years -0.850 34 -0.684 34    -0.166**
Panel B: Style-match
1 year -0.168 59 -0.295          59 0.127
3 years -0.585 40 -0.652 40 0.067
5 years -0.850 34 -0.570 34 -0.280
Note:  ***,  **,  and  *,  denote  that  the  variable  is  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  1%,  5%,  and  10%
significance level, respectively.
Panel A of Table 13,  reports the results  of issuing firms relative to their  size-matched, non-
issuing counterparts. There are no significant differences between the one-year and three-year
equally-weighted buy-and-hold abnormal returns of issuing and non-issuing firms. However,
issuing firms do significantly underperform vis-à-vis non-issuing firms on a 5-year basis. Over
a five-year period, issuing firms earn, on average, 16.6% less than non-issuing firms in absolute
terms.
Panel B of Table 13, reports the results of issuing firms relative to their style-matched, non-
issuing counterparts. Any differences in the magnitude of the comparative performance of
firms are not significant. In accordance to the previous findings in Sections 5.3.1.1 and 5.3.1.2,
applying the style-matching procedure aids in better explaining the differences in comparative
performances, with the results generating no significant differences between issuing and non-
issuing firms. An interesting observation reported in Panel B, is that issuing firms in fact
outperformed on average in comparison to their non-issuing counterparts across the one-, and
three-year time periods. However, this outperformance was not significant.
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Table 14: Value-weighted buy-and-hold abnormal realised returns
Issuing
firms
#Obs. Non-issuing
firms
#Obs. Difference
(1)-(2)
Panel A: Size-match
1 year -0.970 57 -0.969 57 -0.001
3 years -0.981 46 -0.979 46 -0.002
5 years -0.993 35 -0.979 35 -0.014
Panel B: Style-match
1 year -1.001 57 -0.979 57 -0.022
3 years -1.002 46 -0.826 46 -0.176
5 years -1.005 35 -0.973 35 -0.032
Note:  ***,  **,  and  *,  denote  that  the  variable  is  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  1%,  5%,  and  10%
significance level, respectively.
Both Panels A and B of Table 14, in line with the results reported in Table 13, fail to provide
any evidence of SEO underperformance in either of the three time horizons when using a value-
weighted approach of measuring share performance. Once again, the use of a value-weighted
approach appears to attenuate the differences is share performance in the majority of cases.
This result provides further credibility to the implication of the overall results that SEO
underperformance appears to be more prominent in smaller firm.  Fama (1998) argues that
‘bad-model’  problems  are  more  severe  when  examining  equally-weighted  returns,  since  an
equally-weighted approach gives more weight to small firms.
In summary, it appears that the underperformance of issuing firms, as described in the previous
analysis, can be explained to some extent by market risk. By matching firms based on the
recommended style-matching approach, there appears to be no significant differences in the
comparative performance of issuing and non-issuing firms. Thus, the lower buy-and-hold
returns described in the two previous sections could be due to the lower average market risk
faced by issuing firms- possibly justifying their lower returns. The section demonstrates that
including the CAPM in the analysis of share performance explains enough of the variation in
comparative performances between SEO firms and non-issuing firms, to render the difference
insignificant. Therefore, there does not appear to be a ‘new issues puzzle’ in the South African
context when analysing the long-run share performance of issuing firms.
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5.3.1.4 A	Comment	on	the	CAPM	and	the	Market	Risk	of	SEOs	
In light of the existing evidence questioning the capability of the CAPM, this analysis explores
the effectiveness of the CAPM in describing expected returns. Table 15, reports the
significance of the abnormal performance experienced by issuing and non-issuing firms. The
results demonstrate that the actual share returns significantly differ from their expected returns.
If the CAPM correctly predicted the expected returns of the shares, then the abnormal share
returns should not significantly differ from zero. The results illustrate a clear deviation of actual
returns from expected returns, on average, across all firm categories and time horizons. Only
the average one-year buy-and-hold abnormal return of issuing firms is not significant at the 5%
level or higher. In addition, the CAPM seems to overestimate the expected returns, with the
abnormal returns on average being negative. The magnitude of the abnormal returns are also a
cause for concern. For instance, issuing firms have an abnormal return of -85%, on average,
over a five-year period.
Table 15: Significance of the equally-weighted long-run buy-and-hold abnormal realised returns
Issuing firms Size-Match Style-Match #Obs.
1 year -0.168* -0.196*** -0.295***          59
3 years -0.585*** -0.477*** -0.652*** 47
5 years -0.850*** -0.684*** -0.570** 37
Note:  ***,  **,  and  *,  denote  that  the  variable  is  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  1%,  5%,  and  10%
significance level, respectively.
Although the CAPM has clear inadequacies in predicting and explaining the expected returns
of the shares used in this study’s sample, it sufficiently explains the differences in the buy-and-
hold returns between issuing and non-issuing returns, to render these differences insignificant.
The findings in Section 5.3.1.3 merely reflect the ability of the CAPM in describing the
differences in returns between issuing and non-issuing firms. It is not a comment on the
robustness of the CAPM as a measure of expected returns. This is an important distinction. In
essence, the findings of this study simply demonstrates the ability of the CAPM in explaining
the difference in returns between issuing and non-issuing firms. It is not a direct comment on
the asset  pricing environment in South Africa,  nor does it  imply that  the CAPM is the most
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effective asset pricing model in the South African context. Nonetheless, considering the
simplicity of the CAPM and its adequate effectiveness in describing the return patterns of the
firms included in this study’s sample, an alternative, more complex asset pricing model was
not tested in this study.
Table 16 shows the average market risk (Beta) of issuing firms over different time horizons.
This brief analysis shows that the average market risk of SEOs decreases as the post-issue time
horizon increases. These findings are in line with the main conclusions drawn by the rational
theories  that  cite  the  argument  that  the  risk  of  SEO firms  decrease  following  the  SEO,  as  a
potential explanation for the underperformance of issuing firms (Carlson, Fisher &
Giammarino, 2006).
Table 16: Issuing firm average beta analysis
Pre-issue 1 year average 3 year average 5 year average
Issuing firm
beta
1.581*** 1.137*** 0.833*** 0.662***
Note:  ***,  **,  and  *,  denote  that  the  variable  is  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  1%,  5%,  and  10%
significance level, respectively.
5.3.2 The	Effect	of	Investor	Sentiment	on	Long-run	Returns		
Table 17 reports the differences in the equally-weighted long-run market performance of firms
conducting SEOs during periods of high-investor sentiment vis-à-vis firms conducting SEOs
during periods of low-investor sentiment. Ceteris paribus, the market timing theory predicts
that firms that issue shares during periods of high-investor sentiment should demonstrate
inferior post-issue share performance.
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Table 17: Investor sentiment and equally-weighted long-run share performance
SEOs during high-
sentiment periods
(1)
SEOs during low-
sentiment periods
(2)
Difference
(1)-(2)
Panel A: Buy-and-hold returns
1 year -0.198 -0.010  -0.188*
3 years -0.201 0.081 -0.282
5 years -0.297 -0.352  0.055
Panel B: Buy-and-hold abnormal market returns
1 year -1.128 -1.218 0.090
3 years -1.331 -1.408 0.077
5 years -1.617 -1.740 0.123
Panel C: Buy-and-hold abnormal realised returns
1 year -0.112 -0.250 0.138
3 years -0.541 -0.544 0.003
5 years -0.827 -0.897 0.070
Note:  ***,  **,  and  *,  denote  that  the  variable  is  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  1%,  5%,  and  10%
significance level, respectively.
The only significant difference between the share performances of firms issuing during periods
of high-investor sentiment, as opposed to firms issuing during periods of low-investor
sentiment, is the difference in the one-year average buy-and-hold returns. In this instance, and
as hypothesised, firms issuing during periods of high-investor sentiment experienced more
severe long-run underperformance, with a difference in returns of -18.8% relative to low-
sentiment issuers. However, this result is only significant at the 10% level.
In an overwhelming majority of the cases, there are no significant differences between firms
conducting SEOs during the two distinct periods of investor sentiment. In addition to the
insignificance of these differences, most of these differences are positive, in contrast to the
hypothesised relationship between investor sentiment and the long-run share performance of
SEOs. These results are confirmed when using a value-weighted approach of testing long-run
share performance66.
Furthermore, in separate analysis66, investor sentiment does not influence the relative
performance of issuing firms in comparison with non-issuing firms. Issuing firms do not
66 As shown in Section 4 of the Appendix.
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perform any worse or better, relative to non-issuing firms as a consequence of issuing in periods
of low- or high-investor sentiment. This result is consistent across all three time horizons and
across all three measures of share performance.
Thus,  it  can  be  sensibly  concluded  that  investor  sentiment  does  not  appear  to  significantly
influence the long-run share performance of SEOs. Although, it is important to point out that
these tests of investor sentiment are where the limitations of the sample size are most strongly
felt. Nonetheless, dividing the sample on the basis of investor sentiment still leaves enough
observations in both investor sentiment categories to produce reliable results. These results do
not support the predictions set out by the market timing theory.
5.3.3 Factor	Regression	Models	(Robustness	Check)	
Given the documented difficulties in generating unbiased inferences when analysing buy-and-
hold returns (Lyandres, Sun & Zhang, 2005), this study also makes use of factor regressions to
investigate the long-run performance of SEO firms relative to their non-issuing counterparts.
Furthermore, factor regression models are also implemented in order to investigate the
influence of investor sentiment on the long-run share performance of SEO firms.
5.3.3.1 Testing	Long-run	Share	Performance	
Table 18 only reports the intercepts of the various factor regression models, as the focus of this
analysis is on abnormal share performance, which is captured by these intercepts. The results
reported  show  the  use  of  a  three-,  four-,  and  five-year  issuing  window  period  to  form  the
monthly portfolios67. Panel A, which reports the results using an equally-weighted approach of
measuring the monthly portfolio performance, reveals that SEO firms earned significantly
negative abnormal returns when limiting the issuing portfolio to issuing firms that have
conducted SEOs in the prior three-, four-, and five-year issuing windows. For example, issuing
firms earned on average, a monthly negative abnormal return of approximately -1.8% when
using a five-year issuing window period to form monthly portfolio returns.  Size-matched, non-
67 As described in Section 4.2.4, the issuing window periods refer to the time period since issuance that allows for
a share to be included in the monthly portfolio. For example, constructing the monthly returns of the issuing
portfolio using a three-year issuing window period means that only the shares that have issued equity in the last
three years are included in the issuing portfolio for that month.
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issuing firms only showed significantly negative abnormal returns when limiting the portfolio
to a five-year issuing window period, while style-matched, non-issuing firms showed no
evidence of significant abnormal returns in any of the issuing window periods.
Comparing the performance of issuing and non-issuing firms as shown in the last two columns,
reveals no significant evidence that issuing firms underperformed in comparison to either their
size-, or style-matched counterparts in any of the three issuing window periods.  Although SEO
firms do appear to have lower returns, as shown by the negative intercepts throughout the final
two columns, this underperformance is not statistically significant.
Table 18: Abnormal long-run share performance
Panel A: Intercepts (equally-weighted approach)
SEOs Size Style SEOs
relative to
Size
SEOs
relative to
Style
3 year -0.014** -0.006 -0.004 -0.009 -0.011
4 year -0.017** -0.007 -0.004 -0.009 -0.013
5 year -0.018*** -0.011** -0.007 -0.008 -0.012
Panel B: Intercepts (value-weighted approach)
SEOs Size Style SEOs
relative to
Size
SEOs
relative to
Style
3 year -0.003 0.016** 0.005 -0.018* -0.007
4 year -0.006 0.018** 0.005 -0.025** -0.017
5 year -0.005 0.014* 0.004 -0.019** -0.009
Note:  ***,  **,  and  *,  denote  that  the  variable  is  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  1%,  5%,  and  10%
significance level, respectively.
Panel B reports the results of using a value-weighted approach of measuring monthly portfolio
performance. Both SEO firms, and their style-matched counterparts show no evidence of any
significant abnormal returns in any of the issuing window periods. In contrast, size-matched,
non-issuing firms showed significantly positive abnormal returns in all three issuing window
periods68. Finally, SEO firms significantly underperformed relative to their size-matched
counterparts in all three issuing window periods69. For example, issuing firms experienced, on
68 Notably, the positive abnormal returns earned by the size-matched, non-issuing firms in the five-year issuing
window period, is only significant at the 10% level.
69 The relative monthly underperformance measured using a three-year issuing window period, is only significant
at the 10% level.
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average, a lower monthly abnormal return of 1.9% in comparison to their size-matched
counterparts, when using a five-year issuing window period. Notably, issuing firms showed no
evidence of any significant underperformance in comparison to their style-matched
counterparts. This result is in line with the results of the previous sections highlighting the
ability of the style-matching procedure in diminishing the relative underperformance of issuing
firms.
Overall, these robustness tests confirm the earlier findings by further demonstrating the ability
of  the  CAPM  in  explaining  the  relative  performance  of  issuing  firms  and  their  non-issuing
counterparts. When using the recommended style-matching approach, issuing firms show no
evidence of significant underperformance in either the equally-weighted or value-weighted
approach of measuring share performance. In fact, all abnormal portfolio returns fall between
+2% and -2%, and are mainly insignificant, demonstrating that the CAPM does a fairly decent
job in predicting the monthly expected returns of these portfolios. Once again, market risk
seems to explain enough of the variation in returns across the different firm types.
5.3.3.2 Investor	Sentiment	and	Long-run	Share	Performance		
Table 19 reports the coefficient estimates of the various factor regression models aimed at
measuring the effect of investor sentiment on the long-run share performance of issuing firms.
The results reported show the use of a three-, four-, and five-year issuing window period to
form  the  monthly  portfolios.  The  focus  of  this  analysis  is  again  on  the  intercepts.  Panel  A
reports the results of the equally-weighted approach of measuring portfolio performance. The
intercepts are all positive, implying that firms experience superior post-issue share abnormal
performance when conducting SEOs during periods of high-investor sentiment. However,
these findings are only significant when using a five-year issuing window period.  Issuing firms
that conducted SEOs during periods of high-investor sentiment earned, on average, a higher
abnormal return of approximately 2.4% in comparison to firms that conducted SEOs during
periods of low-investor sentiment, when using a five-year issuing window period to form the
monthly portfolios returns.
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Table 19: Investor sentiment and abnormal long-run SEO performance
Panel A: Coefficient estimates (equally-weighted approach)
A (intercept) B #obs.
3 year 0.009 0.058 135
4 year 0.014 0.126 177
5 year 0.024** 0.229* 198
Panel B: Coefficient estimates (value-weighted approach)
A (intercept) B #obs.
3 year 0.053*** 0.597*** 125
4 year 0.035** 0.479*** 168
5 year 0.038*** 0.488*** 189
Note:  ***,  **,  and  *,  denote  that  the  variable  is  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  1%,  5%,  and  10%
significance level, respectively.
Panel B reports the results of the value-weighted approach of measuring portfolio performance.
In addition to all the intercepts again being positive, they are all significant. For example,
issuing firms that conducted SEOs during periods of high-investor sentiment earned, on
average, a higher abnormal return of approximately 5.3%  relative to firms that conducted
SEOs during periods of low-investor sentiment, when using a three-year issuing window period
to form the monthly portfolios returns.
Overall, these results contradict both the hypothesised relationship assumed by market timing
theories and the results of Chou and Lin (2015), who found that firms issuing during periods
of high-investor sentiment experienced more severe post-issue long-run underperformance. In
line with earlier findings of this study, there is no evidence in support of the market timing
theory’s ability to explain long-run SEO share performance.
5.4 Long-run	Operating	Performance	
5.4.1 Operating	Performance	
5.4.1.1 Year	on	Year	Percentage	Changes		
Table 20 reports and compares the annual, median percentage change of earnings per shares
(EPS) for issuing firms and non-issuing firms for both size-matched, and style-matched
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portfolios. For the size-matched portfolios, issuing firms experience significantly worse
changes in EPS in comparison to non-issuing firms, in the third and fourth years after the equity
issue, although the latter observation is only significant at the 10% level. In relation to the style-
matched portfolios, issuing firms experience significant inferior performance in the EPS
changes for years two, three and five, although the latter two observations are only significant
at the 10% level.
Table 20: Earnings per share (year on year % change)
Fiscal year relative to issuing
-1 1 2 3 4 5
Issuing
firms (1)
0.114 0.163 -0.188 -0.202 -0.285 -0.126
Size match
(2)
0.138 0.104 0.036 0.175 0.110 0.125
Style match
(3)
0.171 0.100 0.122 0.057 0.119 0.126
Difference
(1)-(2)
-0.024 0.059 -0.224 -0.377*** -0.395* -0.251
Difference
(1)-(3)
-0.057 0.063 -0.310** -0.259* -0.404* -0.252
Note:  ***,  **,  and  *,  denote  that  the  variable  is  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  1%,  5%,  and  10%
significance level, respectively.
Overall, these results do show a slight indication of issuing firm underperformance, but with a
notable lack of conviction. Despite the lack of compelling evidence pointing toward a clear
pattern of relative underperformance, an interesting pattern still emerges. Issuing firms show
significant negative median year-on-year percentage changes in year two through to year five
following the SEO announcement which is a potential cause of concern considering that the
size-, and style-matched firms have a positive median year-on-year percentage change
throughout the entire period.
Tables 21 and 22 report and compare the annual, median percentage change of return on assets
(ROA) and returns on equity (ROE), respectively, for issuing firms and non-issuing firms for
both size-matched, and style-matched portfolios. With exception of the change in ROA in  year
one, for issuing firms relative to their size-matched counterparts (which is only significant at
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the 10% level), there does not appear to be any significant differences in the annual percentage
changes  in  either  ROA  or  ROE,  between  issuing  and  non-issuing  firms  for  both  the  size-
matched, and the style-matched portfolios.
Table 21: Return on assets (year on year % change)
Fiscal year relative to issuing
-1 1 2 3 4 5
Issuing
firms (1)
-0.077 -0.258 -0.058 -0.102 -0.274 -0.195
Size match
(2)
0.008 0.010 -0.077 -0.067 -0.077 -0.049
Style match
(3)
-0.089 -0.067 -0.063 0.033 -0.030 -0.047
Difference
(1)-(2)
-0.085 -0.268* 0.019 -0.035 -0.197 -0.146
Difference
(1)-(3)
0.012 -0.191 0.005 -0.135 -0.244 -0.148
Note:  ***,  **,  and  *,  denote  that  the  variable  is  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  1%,  5%,  and  10%
significance level, respectively.
Table 22: Return on equity (year on year % change)
Fiscal year relative to issuing
-1 1 2 3 4 5
Issuing
firms (1)
-0.182 -0.424 -0.473 -0.437 -0.288 -0.156
Size match
(2)
-0.029 -0.129 -0.354 -0.135 -0.214 -0.053
Style match
(3)
0.110 -0.272 -0.228 -0.222 -0.142 0.009
Difference
(1)-(2)
-0.153 -0.295 -0.119 -0.302 -0.074 -0.103
Difference
(1)-(3)
-0.292 -0.152 -0.245 -0.215 -0.146 -0.165
Note:  ***,  **,  and  *,  denote  that  the  variable  is  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  1%,  5%,  and  10%
significance level, respectively.
In both tables, issuing firms experience negative median year-on-year percentage changes from
the year prior to the SEO announcements up until year five after the SEO is announced. These
results are less of a concern considering that the size-, and style-matched firms also generally
experience these negative annual changes.
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Overall, it is interesting to note that the difference in operating performance of issuing firms
compared  to  non-issuing  firms  in  the  year  before  the  equity  issue  is  generally  negative  and
consistently insignificant. In contrast to the international evidence in support of the market
timing theory, issuing firms do not display superior operating performance prior to issuing
equity. Therefore, there is no evidence that managers are attempting to take advantage of any
superior, pre-issue operating performance when issuing shares. There is also no clear indication
that issuing firms show inferior long-run operating performance relative to non-issuing firms
subsequent  to  the  SEO.  Even  though  it  appears  that  in  the  majority  of  cases  issuing  firms
experienced an inferior change in the operating performance measures, these differences are
generally not significant and do not present any consistent patterns. Furthermore, there does
not appear to be any consistent improvement demonstrated by comparing the relative operating
performance of issuing firms and their non-issuing counterparts using the style-matching
procedure, instead of the simpler size-matching procedure.
5.4.1.2 Cumulative	Performance	
Table 23 reports the results of the cumulative operating performance as measured by the
median of the cumulative year-on-year percentage change. These results represent the
cumulative operating performance changes over the given time periods, henceforth referred to
as simply the firm’s cumulative operating performance.
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Table 23: Cumulative operating performance changes
EPS ROA ROE
3 years 5 years 3 years 5 years 3 years 5 years
Issuing
firms (1)
-0.302 -0.055 -0.228 -0.643 -0.602 -0.661
Size match
(2)
0.066 0.313 -0.021 -0.156 -0.209 -0.308
Style match
(3)
0.064 0.901 -0.170 -0.113 -0.257 -0.259
Difference
(1)-(2)
-0.368 -0.368 -0.207 -0.487 -0.393** -0.353**
Difference
(1)-(3)
-0.366 -0.956** -0.058 -0.530* -0.345** -0.402***
Note:  ***,  **,  and  *,  denote  that  the  variable  is  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  1%,  5%,  and  10%
significance level, respectively.
Issuing firms demonstrate significant operating underperformance over a five-year period
relative to their style-matched counterparts in terms of cumulative EPS performance, but no
significant differences are recorded over a three year period. Issuing firms also show no sign
of any significant operating underperformance in terms of their cumulative EPS performance
in comparison to their size-matched counterparts.
Furthermore, issuing firms do not significantly underperform relative to either their size-
matched, or style-matched equivalents when considering the cumulative ROA performance.
The one exception is the significant underperformance of SEO firms in comparison to style-
matched firms over a five-year period (which is only significant at the 10% level).
Finally, issuing firms significantly underperform in comparison to both size-matched, and
style-matched firms over both a three-, and five-year time horizon in terms of their cumulative
ROE performance. These results are consistent with the literature documenting the
underperformance of issuing firms (Loughran & Ritter, 1997).
Overall, there is mixed evidence on the relative operating performance of issuing firms. Across
all three measures of operating performance over three-, and five-year time horizons, issuing
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firms do seem to perform worse than both their style-matched, and their size-matched
counterparts in terms of the magnitude of the median cumulative annual changes. However,
these results lack consistent significance in order to establish a clear pattern. Only the
cumulative ROE performance of issuing firms displays robust significance. Ultimately, and in
conjunction with the evidence found in Section 5.4.1.1, there is insufficient evidence to
credibly conclude that issuing firms display significant operating underperformance.
Ignoring the relative performance and analysing the performance of issuing firms on their own,
it is clear that issuing firms do seem to display signs of poor operating performance. A majority
of the median annual year-on-year percentage changes in Section 5.4.1.1 are negative for
issuing firms. In addition, the median cumulative operating performance of issuing firms (for
all three operating performance measures) is negative at both the three-, and five-year horizons.
Nonetheless, the findings fail to establish a connection between this poor operating
performance and the firm’s decision to conduct SEOs considering that: (1) issuing firms
generally experienced these negative patterns in the year prior to issuing new shares in the case
of the median annual change in ROE and ROA; and (2) issuing firms showed no consistently
significant evidence of relative underperformance vis-à-vis their non-issuing counterparts.
5.4.2 The	Effect	of	Investor	Sentiment	on	Operating	Performance		
Table 24 investigates the relationship between investor sentiment and the year-on-year
percentage change in the three measures of operating performance. Overall, these results
provide no meaningful evidence of any significant impact of investor sentiment on operating
performance. This relationship has not been tested in previous studies, as previous literature
has focused solely on the effect  of investor sentiment on the market performance of issuing
firms.
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Table 24: Investor sentiment and operating performance
SEOs during high-
sentiment periods
(1)
SEOs during low-
sentiment periods
(2)
Difference
(1)-(2)
PANEL A: EPS
Fiscal year relative
to issuing
1 0.140 0.173 -0.033
2 -0.226 0.071 -0.297
3 -0.084 -0.410 0.326*
4 -0.262 -0.390 0.128
5 0.128 -0.741 0.869*
PANEL B: ROA
Fiscal year relative
to issuing
1 -0.151 -0.421 0.27
2 -0.076 -0.025 -0.051
3 0.044 -0.384 0.428
4 -0.156 -0.402 0.246
5 -0.303 -0.169 -0.134
PANEL C: ROE
Fiscal year relative
to issuing
1 -0.303 -0.169 -0.134
2 -0.329 -0.072 -0.257
3 -0.116 -0.519 0.403
4 -0.214 -0.671 0.457
5 -0.154 -0.292 0.138
Note:  ***,  **,  and  *,  denote  that  the  variable  is  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  1%,  5%,  and  10%
significance level, respectively.
Although existing literature is yet to comment on the influence of investor sentiment on a firm’s
operating performance, it makes sense that the operating performance of a firm is not
significantly influenced by investor sentiment. A firm’s operating performance should be
influenced by the firm’s managers and insiders, and less so by investor sentiment. It also makes
sense that if investor sentiment does not significantly influence the market performance of
SEOs,  as  shown in  the  previous  sections,  it  would  not  significantly  influence  the  operating
performance of SEOs, as it can also be argued that a firm’s market performance is more
sensitive to investor sentiment than a firm’s operating performance.
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Thus, these results are not entirely unexpected and fit in with the earlier findings of this study,
with the only significant differences, both only at the 10% significant level, occurring in years
3 and 5 with regards to the annual earnings per share changes. Moreover, these positive
differences, implying that issuing firms performed better in these periods, are against the
hypothesised relationship between operating performance and investor sentiment that would
be in line with the market timing predictions set out in this study.
5.5 Summary	of	the	Results		
Analysis of SEO announcement effects provides evidence that is consistent with the adverse
selection model pioneered by Myers and Majulf (1984). The market, on average, reacts
negatively to SEO announcements with a statistically significant average two-day cumulative
abnormal return of -2.6%, following the announcement. The regression analysis further reveals
that the market’s reaction to the SEO announcement is not significantly influenced by either
the firm’s size, Tobin’s Q-ratio, market-to-book ratio, or the relative size of the equity issue.
Similarly, investor sentiment bears no substantial impact on the market’s initial reaction to the
news that a firm is conducting a SEO.
While issuing firms generally underperform when comparing the equally-weighted buy-and-
hold returns and buy-and-hold abnormal market returns, as well as the value-weighted buy-
and-hold abnormal market returns, these returns differences seem to be explained by the
introduction  of  market  risk  into  the  empirical  framework.  Issuing  firms  do  not  exhibit  any
significant underperformance when comparing either the equally-weighted, or the value-
weighted abnormal buy-and-and hold abnormal realised returns, which are modelled on the
CAPM70. The attenuating effect on SEO underperformance derived from using a value-
weighted approach of measuring share performance, as opposed to an equally-weighted
approach, implies that SEO underperformance is more prominent in smaller firms.
70 These results are confirmed using factor regression analysis.
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The analysis of the operating performance of issuing firms reveals no patterns of consistent,
significant underperformance. Despite issuing firms underperforming on their cumulative ROE
performance, there are no such distinctive results when considering their cumulative EPS and
ROA performance. Likewise, analysis of the year-on-year median percentage changes in these
three  accounting  ratios  do  not  signal  that  issuing  firms  are  significantly  underperforming  in
comparison to non-issuing firms. This does not discount the fact that issuing firms show signs
of poor operating performance. However, there does not appear to be any clear link between
this poor operating performance and the decision to conduct SEOs.
The  overall  analysis  of  the  influence  of  investor  sentiment  on  the  performance  of  SEOs
suggests that investor sentiment does not play any consistently significant role in either the
short-run or the long-run performance of SEOs, in addition to having no significant influence
on a firm’s decision to conduct SEOs. In contrast  to the predictions put forth by the market
timing theory, the factor model regression analysis reveals that investor sentiment actually has
a significantly positive influence on the long-run share performance of SEOs in various
instances (refer to Table 19).
Overall, these results provide no evidence consistent with the behavioural explanations,
particularly those involving market timing considerations that attempt to describe the long-run
performances of issuing firms. Instead, the results are consistent with the rational framework
whereby any differences in returns between issuing and non-issuing firms are sufficiently
explained by the variation in market risk.
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6 Conclusion		
6.1 The	Background		
The capital structure decision that firms undertake as they contemplate the choice between
financing the firm through debt or equity has attracted much academic attention over the past
decade. With the analysis of debt issues producing relatively straight-forward findings,
researchers began to focus their efforts on the issuing of equity by listed firms, which soon led
to the revelation of fascinating patterns that demanded an explanation. In particular, two well-
documented patterns emerged: (1) a negative short-run share price reaction to SEO
announcements; and (2) the long-run operating and share price underperformance of issuing
firms in comparison to similar non-issuing firms.
While the market’s typically negative reaction to SEO announcements appears to be well
explained by the adverse selection model developed by Myers and Majluf (1984), the widely-
documented poor long-run performance of issuing firms, for periods reaching up to five years
after issuance, has been far more difficult to explain.  Opinions have been divided on whether
there is a rational explanation to this phenomenon or whether the explanation lies within the
behavioural intricacies attributed to stock market participants. Despite the importance of these
findings and the potential benefits from understanding the market’s reaction to SEOs, the topic
has until now been widely ignored by the South African literature. As a result, this study set
out to explore the short-run and long-run performance of SEOs on the JSE.
6.2 The	SEO	Decision	and	the	Short-run	Effects		
Firstly,  the  initial  decision  on  whether  or  not  a  firm  conducts  a  SEO  was  analysed  using
regression analysis. The findings reveal that investor sentiment, a firm’s prior abnormal returns,
and  a  firm’s  market-to-book  ratio,  all  bear  no  significant  influence  on  a  firm’s  decision  on
whether or not to conduct a SEO. This result casts the first shadow of doubt on the ability of
the market timing theory in explaining the performance of SEOs on the JSE. The market timing
theory, the popular centre-piece of the behavioural finance theories relevant to SEOs,
93
hypothesises that managers would attempt to issue equity during periods of high-investor
sentiment, when share prices are more likely to experience over-evaluation. Although a firm’s
prior abnormal share performance and market-to-book ratios, which are other popular proxies
of share price misvaluation, should also influence the market timing ability of managers, no
such evidence was found.
Secondly, an event study was undertaken in order to investigate issuing firms’ short-run share
performance subsequent to the SEO announcement. The analysis reveals that the market
reaction to SEO announcements is generally negative, with an average two-day cumulative
abnormal return of -2.6%. These findings are consistent with the adverse selection model set
forth  by  Myers  and  Majulf  (1984),  and  are  quantitatively  and  qualitatively  similar  to  the
majority of the existing SEO literature71. Investors are generally sceptical of a firm’s
motivation behind the issue of new shares, and therefore react negatively to the SEO
announcements. One must also not overlook the dilution effect, which is related to the law of
supply. The mere action of increasing the number of shares in issue should also naturally create
downward price pressure.
In addition, neither the issuing firm’s size, market-to-book ratio, Tobin’s Q-ratio, nor the size
of the equity issue relative to the issuing firm’s size, show any significant influence on the
market’s reaction to the SEO announcement. These factors do not appear to either alleviate or
aggravate the market’s generally negative initial reaction to SEO announcements. Further
analysis of the short-run share performance of SEOs also reveals that the market’s reaction to
the announcements is not significantly influenced by investor sentiment. Ceteris paribus, it
was  expected  that  investors  would  react  less  negatively  to  the  SEO  announcement  during
periods of high-investor sentiment, but no such significant benefit was found for firms issuing
shares during these periods.
71 For example, see Ritter (2003).
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6.3 The	Long-run	Effects		
Finally, the long-run performance of SEOs was analysed by comparing the share performance
and operating performance of issuing firms vis-à-vis non-issuing firms.  In line with the
previous literature, issuing firms severely underperform in comparison to non-issuing firms
when examining: (1) the equally-weighted buy-and-hold returns; (2) the equally-weighted buy-
and-hold abnormal market returns; and (3) the value-weighted buy-and-hold abnormal market
returns. These findings also demonstrate that using a value-weighted approach of measuring
share performance, as opposed to an equally-weighted approach, reduces the magnitude, and
even the significance of SEO underperformance. This implies that SEO underperformance is
more prominent in smaller firms.
In contrast,  the analysis of both the equally-weighted,  and the value-weighted buy-and-hold
abnormal realised returns, which predicts expected returns based on the Capital Asset Pricing
Model, reveals no significant differences between the respective performance of issuing and
non-issuing  firms.  Thus,  it  appears  that  the  differences  in  the  share  performance  of  issuing
firms in comparison to non-issuing firms, as discussed in the previous paragraph, is adequately
explained by the differences in the market risk between these firms. This supports the rational
model framework for explaining the long-run share price performance of issuing firms. These
results hold across a one-, three-, and five-year time horizon when matching firms based on the
recommended style-matching procedure. Furthermore, these results are robust to the analysis
of abnormal share performance using factor regression models.
Although the CAPM has received major criticism over time, market risk (Beta) is adequate
enough in explaining the variation of returns between issuing and non-issuing firms, to render
the differences in returns between these firms insignificant. Notably, this finding is not a
comment on the efficacy of the CAPM in explaining the expected returns of firms listed on the
JSE, but an illustration of its ability to sufficiently account for enough variation in the
underlying market risk of issuing and non-issuing firms to help explain the differences in the
share returns of these firms. The aim of this study does not include making any direct comment
on the asset pricing environment in South Africa.
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It is also important to consider the influence that matching firms through a style-matching
procedure, which controls for both the size and the market-to-book ratio of issuing firms, has
in explaining share performance. Use of a style-matching procedure, as opposed to the much
simpler size-matching procedure, generally reduces the magnitude of the difference in the share
performance of issuing firms relative to non-issuing firms. These findings are unsurprising
considering  that  both  the  size  of  a  firm,  and  the  firm’s  market-to-book  ratio  have  famously
been documented as important risk factors in explaining the expected returns of shares (Fama
& French, 1993). These results also add further support for the use of rational models that
explain the long-run performance of SEOs under a risk-return framework.
The  analysis  of  the  relative  operating  performance  also  revealed  no  consistently  significant
differences between the operating performance of issuing and non-issuing firms across the five-
year time horizon following the equity issuance, or in the year prior to the SEO. Even though
issuing firms experienced poor operating performance subsequent to issuing equity, the
operating performance of these firms prior to issuing the equity was also generally poor. Thus,
there are no indications that any subsequent poor operating performance experienced by issuing
firms was as a consequence of the firm’s decision to issue new shares.
Furthermore, after analysing the relationship of investor sentiment and the long-run
performance of issuing firms, there appears to be no consistent evidence of any significant
relationship. Investor sentiment does not appear to materially influence the long-run share
performance or operating performance of issuing firms, casting further doubt on the ability of
the market timing theory to explain the long-run performance of SEOs. Only the factor
regression models, used as robustness checks, revealed any significant relationship between
investor sentiment and the long-run share performance of SEOs, but only in certain instances.
In fact, the factor regression analysis revealed a significant, positive relationship between
investor sentiment and share performance in certain cases, which completely contradicts the
hypothesised relationship set forth by the market timing theories.
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Overall, this study does not submit any credible evidence that market-timing considerations
are significant in explaining the long-run performance of SEOs, without denying that these
considerations may still indirectly influence the short-run performance of SEOs. Even if
managers do not attempt to ever benefit from any over-valuations in the share price of their
firms, however unlikely that is, investors could still rationally question the motives behind a
firm’s decision to issue equity. Therefore, investors could still react negatively to SEO
announcements, due to their fear that managers may be attempting to time the market (Myers
& Majluf, 1984). Although investor sentiment does not appear to influence issuing firms
significantly enough to warrant a substantial deviation from the rational predictions of their
long-run performance, these findings do not serve to deny the significant influence of investor
sentiment on the stock market as a whole.
6.4 The	Final	Verdict		
In summary, the results of this study are inconsistent with the existing literature which argues
that the long-run performance of issuing firms signalled an initial underreaction to SEOs
buoyed by over-optimistic investors (Loughran & Ritter, 1995). Instead, the long-run
performance of issuing firms appears to be adequately explained by the rational models centred
on the risk-return framework, implying that investors are reacting swiftly to SEOs in an
unbiased fashion. Therefore,  there does not appear to be a ‘new issues puzzle’ in the South
African context… and why should there be?
6.5 Potential	Avenues	for	Future	Research		
This  study  also  brings  to  light  the  potential  avenues  for  future  research.  Particularly,  more
attention should be focused towards examining the post-issue risk patterns of SEO firms. Due
to the ability of the CAPM to adequately explain SEO performance in this study, no other
pricing models or risk considerations were examined, leaving room for future exploration.
Understanding the repercussions that conducting SEOs has on the risk of the issuing firms in
more detail, would further assist managers in making their capital structure decisions.
International studies have benefited from dedicating meticulous attention to analysing the risk
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of issuing-firms. For instance, Lyandres, Sun and Zhang (2005)  proved that issuing-firms tend
to have lower liquidity betas, whilst Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino (2006) found that using
a dynamic beta approach led to SEO underperformance disappearing. The comprehensive
nature of this study resulted in these avenues of research remaining unexplored.
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APPENDIX		
1. Logit	Regression	Models	
This section reports the correlation between the four variables used to construct the investor
sentiment index and the other explanatory variables used in the Logit regression models.
Table A: Correlation matrix for logit regression models
Prior
12
Prior
36
future
12
future
36
M/B NIPO RIPO Turn Prem
Prior
12
1.000
Prior
36
0.415 1.000
future
12
-0.019 -0.037 1.000
future
36
0.122 0.100 0.453 1.000
M/B 0.111 0.044 0.019 0.063 1.000
NIPO 0.016 0.044 0.259 -0.012 0.005 1.000
RIPO 0.052 -0.117 -0.105 -0.003 0.004 -0.332 1.000
Turn -0.030 -0.033 -0.287 0.023 -0.014 -0.938 0.348 1.000
Prem 0.020 0.024 -0.274 0.033 -0.025 -0.484 -0.370 0.473 1.000
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2. Event	Study	Analysis		
This section demonstrates the market’s reaction to SEO announcements when measuring the
actual return compared to: (1) the share’s prior 10 day average; and (2) the share’s prior 10 day
maximum.
Table B: The stock market's reaction to SEO announcements
Mean Median #Obs. Std.Dev Neg. /Pos.
Panel A: Using the share’s prior 10 day average as a benchmark
1-day
return -0.026*** -0.014*** 149 0.042 111/27
2-day
cumulative
return
-0.024*** -0.014*** 149 0.090 88/51
Panel B: Using the share’s prior 10 day maximum as a benchmark
1-day
return -0.097*** -0.063*** 149 0.042 134/3
2-day
cumulative
return
-0.165*** -0.101*** 149 0.090 132/6
Note: ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and * denotes significance
at the 10% level.
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3. Comparing	Long-run	Share	Performance		
This section compares the long-run performance of SEO firms vis-à-vis their non-issuing
counterparts using various robustness measures. These results show that main findings of this
study are robust to both (1) the inclusion of the omitted outliers (using both an equally-weighted
and a value-weighted approach); and (2) the omission of firms that have conducted multiple
announcements in a five-year period. SEO firms do not significantly underperform when
comparing the buy-and-hold abnormal returns as predicted by CAPM (rBHARs).
3.1	Equally-weighted	Approach	(Total	Sample)	
Table C: Long-run buy and hold returns (BHRs)
Issuing
firms
#Obs. Non-issuing
firms
#Obs. Difference
(1)-(2)
Panel A: Size-match
1 year -0.115 47 0.116 47 -0.231**
3 years 0.166 42 0.883 42 -0.717**
5 years 0.184 33 1.766 33 -1.582***
Panel B: Style-match
1 year -0.115 47 0.191 47 -0.306***
3 years 0.166 42 1.168 42 -1.002**
5 years 0.184 33 3.222 33 -3.038**
Note: ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and * denotes significance
at the 10% level.
Table D: Long-run Buy and hold abnormal market returns (mBHARs)
Issuing
firms
#Obs. Non-issuing
firms
#Obs. Difference
(1)-(2)
Panel A: Size-match
1 year -1.169 47 -0.939 47 -0.230**
3 years -1.163 42 -0.447 42 -0.716**
5 years -1.418 33 0.164 33 -1.582***
Panel B: Style-match
1 year -1.169 47 -0.863 47 -0.306***
3 years -1.163 42 -0.162 42 -1.001**
5 years -1.418 33 1.492 33 -2.910**
Note: ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and * denotes significance
at the 10% level.
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Table E: Long-run Buy and hold abnormal realised returns (rBHARs)
Issuing
firms
#Obs. Non-issuing
firms
#Obs. Difference
(1)-(2)
Panel A: Size-match
1 year 2.143 47 0.284 47 1.859
3 years 0.264 42 1.308 42 -1.044
5 years 1.221 33 3.851 33 -2.630
Panel B: Style-match
1 year 2.143 47 0.826 47 1.317
3 years 0.264 42 -0.267 42 0.531
5 years 1.221 33 -0.302 33 1.523
Note: ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and * denotes significance
at the 10% level.
3.2	Value-weighted	Approach	(Total	Sample)	
Table F: Long-run buy and hold returns (BHRs)
Issuing
firms
#Obs. Non-issuing
firms
#Obs. Difference
(1)-(2)
Panel A: Size-match
1 year 0.218 74 0.399 74 -0.181
3 years 1.573 65 1.446 65 0.127
5 years 1.517 52 3.421 52 -1.904
Panel B: Style-match
1 year 0.218 74 0.306 74 -0.088
3 years 1.573 65 5.614 65 -4.041
5 years 1.517 52 15.29 52 -13.773
Note: ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and * denotes significance
at the 10% level.
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Table G: Long-run Buy and hold abnormal market returns (mBHARs)
Issuing
firms
#Obs. Non-issuing
firms
#Obs. Difference
(1)-(2)
Panel A: Size-match
1 year -1.220 74 -1.037 74 -0.183
3 years -0.425 65 -0.551 65 0.126
5 years -1.357 52 0.552 52 -1.909*
Panel B: Style-match
1 year -1.220 74 -2.139 74 0.919
3 years -0.425 65 3.592 65 -4.017
5 years -1.357 52 12.495 52 -13.852
Note: ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and * denotes significance
at the 10% level.
Table H: Long-run Buy and hold abnormal realised returns (rBHARs)
Issuing
firms
#Obs. Non-issuing
firms
#Obs. Difference
(1)-(2)
Panel A: Size-match
1 year 6.200 74 0.567 74 5.633
3 years 4.684 65 1.833 65 2.851
5 years 1.853 52 3.702 52 -1.849
Panel B: Style-match
1 year 6.200 74 0.105 74 6.095
3 years 4.684 65 1.771 65 2.913
5 years 1.853 52 4.463 52 -2.610
Note: ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and * denotes significance
at the 10% level.
3.3	Omitting	Firms	with	Multiple	SEO	Announcements		
Table I: Long-run buy and hold returns (BHRs)
Issuing
firms
#Obs. Non-issuing
firms
#Obs. Difference
(1)-(2)
Panel A: Size-match
1 year -0.115 47 0.116 47 -0.231**
3 years 0.166 42 0.883 42 -0.717**
5 years 0.184 33 1.766 33 -1.582***
Panel B: Style-match
1 year -0.115 47 0.191 47 -0.306***
3 years 0.166 42 1.168 42 -1.002**
5 years 0.184 33 3.222 33 -3.038**
Note: ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and * denotes significance
at the 10% level.
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Table J: Long-run Buy and hold abnormal market returns (mBHARs)
Issuing
firms
#Obs. Non-issuing
firms
#Obs. Difference
(1)-(2)
Panel A: Size-match
1 year -1.169 47 -0.939 47 -0.230**
3 years -1.163 42 -0.447 42 -0.716**
5 years -1.418 33 0.164 33 -1.582***
Panel B: Style-match
1 year -1.169 47 -0.863 47 -0.306***
3 years -1.163 42 -0.162 42 -1.001**
5 years -1.418 33 1.492 33 -2.910**
Note: ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and * denotes significance
at the 10% level.
Table K: Long-run Buy and hold abnormal realised returns (rBHARs)
Issuing
firms
#Obs. Non-issuing
firms
#Obs. Difference
(1)-(2)
Panel A: Size-match
1 year 2.143 47 0.284 47 1.859
3 years 0.264 42 1.308 42 -1.044
5 years 1.221 33 3.851 33 -2.630
Panel B: Style-match
1 year 2.143 47 0.826 47 1.317
3 years 0.264 42 -0.267 42 0.531
5 years 1.221 33 -0.302 33 1.523
Note: ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and * denotes significance
at the 10% level.
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4. Investor	Sentiment	and	Long-run	Share	Performance	
This section confirms the main findings of this study, which fails to demonstrate any consistent
evidence that investor sentiment influences the long-run share performance of issuing firms.
This results holds for: (1) the inclusion or exclusion of outliers in both the equally-weighted
and the value-weighted approach; (2) the relative performance of issuing firms vis-à-vis their
size-, and style-matched counterparts.
4.1	Equally-weighted	(Total	Sample)	
Table L: Investor sentiment and long-run share performance
SEOs during high-
sentiment periods
(1)
SEOs during low-
sentiment periods
(2)
Difference
(1)-(2)
Panel A: BHRs
1 year 0.013 -0.003 0.016
3 years -0.122 0.389 -0.511*
5 years 0.569 -0.126 0.695*
Panel B: BHARs (relative to market returns)
1 year -0.985 -1.173 0.188
3 years -1.277 -1.206 -0.071
5 years -1.086 -1.774 0.688*
Panel C: BHARs (relative to expected returns)
1 year 2.791 3.921 -1.130
3 years 1.952 -0.013 1.965
5 years 1.929 -0.833 2.762
Note: ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and * denotes significance
at the 10% level.
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4.2	Value-weighted	(Total	Sample)	
Table M: Investor sentiment and long-run share performance
SEOs during high-
sentiment periods
(1)
SEOs during low-
sentiment periods
(2)
Difference
(1)-(2)
Panel A: BHRs
1 year 0.382 -0.037 0.419
3 years 2.863 -0.362 3.225
5 years 2.182 0.262 1.920
Panel B: BHARs (relative to market returns)
1 year -1.243 -1.183 -0.06
3 years 0.577 -1.928 2.505
5 years -1.031 -1.972 0.941**
Panel C: BHARs (relative to expected returns)
1 year 1.335 13.750 -12.415
3 years 7.179 0.942 6.237
5 years 3.215 -0.718 3.933
Note: ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and * denotes significance
at the 10% level.
4.3	Value-weighted	(Omitting	Outliers)	
Table N: Investor sentiment and long-run share performance
SEOs during high-
sentiment periods
(1)
SEOs during low-
sentiment periods
(2)
Difference
(1)-(2)
Panel A: BHRs
1 year -0.983 -0.987 0.004
3 years -0.983 -0.996 0.013
5 years -0.973 -0.978 0.005
Panel B: BHARs (relative to market returns)
1 year -1.000 -1.001 0.001
3 years -1.001 -1.003 0.002
5 years -1.003 -1.009 0.006
Panel C: BHARs (relative to expected returns)
1 year -0.960 -0.987 0.027
3 years -0.980 -0.982 0.002
5 years -0.990 -0.998 0.008
Note: ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and * denotes significance
at the 10% level.
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4.4	Relative	Performance		
Table O: Investor sentiment and long-run performance relative to size-matched firms
During high-
sentiment periods
(1)
During low-
sentiment periods
(2)
Difference
(1)-(2)
Panel A: BHRs
1 year -0.941 -1.497 0.556**
3 years -1.603 -2.280 0.677
5 years -1.982 -3.538 1.556**
Panel B: BHARs (relative to market returns)
1 year -0.941 -1.497 0.556**
3 years -1.603 -2.28 0.677
5 years -1.982 -3.538 1.556**
Panel C: BHARs (relative to expected returns)
1 year -0.349 2.604 -2.953
3 years 0.353 -2.130 2.483
5 years -0.910 -5.521 4.611
Note: ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and * denotes significance
at the 10% level.
Table P: Investor sentiment and long-run performance relative to style-matched firms
During high-
sentiment periods
(1)
During low-
sentiment periods
(2)
Difference
(1)-(2)
Panel A: BHRs
1 year -1.219 -1.200 -0.019
3 years -2.765 -1.328 -1.437**
5 years -4.704 -2.313 -2.391*
Panel B: BHARs (relative to market returns)
1 year -1.219 -1.2 -0.019
3 years -2.765 -1.328 -1.437**
5 years -4.704 -2.313 -2.391*
Panel C: BHARs (relative to expected returns)
1 year -0.543 3.077 -3.620
3 years -6.222 -0.913 -5.309
5 years -6.374 -1.380 -4.994
Note: ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and * denotes significance
at the 10% level.
